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Abstract 
The impact of the media and public sentiment on foreign policy has been 
the focus of much discussion in both academic and political circles since 
coverage of the Vietnam War revealed to the world the pervasive nature 
of the media. This impact is greatly affected by the political order of each 
country and the domestic structures that determine the function of the 
media and the ways in which public sentiment is expressed in each 
society. This thesis examines the effect of public sentiment and the media 
on foreign policy in China and Japan in the case of the Senkaku Islands 
dispute. This will be conducted through analysis of vernacular and 
English language press coverage of the dispute in China, Japan and Hong 
Kong at the height of recent tensions from 1996-1998. 
Examination of China and Japan provide insight into the differences 
between an authoritarian regime and a liberal democratic society and how 
the respective governments seek to control, manipulate and respond to the 
media and the public. Although the fundamental 'Senkaku policy' of each 
government was not 'changed' by media or public influence, shifts in 
policy were obvious. Although media theory often assumes public and 
media impact to be greater in a democratic society such as Japan, this 
research discovered that in the case of the Senkaku dispute, the Chinese 
government despite efforts to control opinion, were most affected by the 
public as the government acted to seek resolution and defuse anti-
Japanese sentiment on both the Mainland and in Hong Kong that 
threatened the stability of important bilateral relations with Japan. 
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Introduction 
This thesis will examine the effect of the media and public sentiment on foreign policy 
in the case of the Senkaku Islands dispute in China and Japan. This paper will analyse 
media coverage since the July 1996 'Lighthouse Incident'. The building of a lighthouse 
on one of the disputed islands by Japanese ultranationalists created a 'lightning rod 
effect' and suddenly reignited anti-Japanese sentiment amongst the Chinese. The act 
triggered protests in Hong Kong, Taiwan and on the Mainland, with the Chinese people 
claiming that Japanese aggressors had again 'violated' their sovereign rights. The 
protests climaxed in September 1996 with the drowning of a Hong Kong activist in the 
waters off the islands and the illegal landing on Japanese territory of Chinese protestors 
in October 1996. 
After 33 years of difficult relations, in 1978, Japan and China finally signed a Treaty of 
Peace and Friendship, marking the formal end of a state of war between Japan and the 
Chinese government on the Mainland that Japan had only recognised since 1972. The 
treaty superseded a similar one signed by Japan and the Republic of China on Taiwan in 
1952. This effectively ended poor relations that had been in place since the Japanese 
occupation of Manchuria, Northern China in 1931. The treaty has been pr:~carious but 
both parties, realising the mutual benefit in healthy relations, have worked to preserve it. 
However, this fragile relationship was shaken by the lighthouse construction as the 
controversy surrounding the disputed islands flared once again. The small group of 
uninhabited islands, referred to as the Senkaku Islands in Japan and the Diaoyu Islands 
in China, are situated between Taiwan and Okinawa in the East China Sea. Although the 
Japanese have had possession since the late 19th century, the announcement of potential 
oil and gas deposits beneath the islands in the late 1960s has created much protest and 
tension as the islands are now of great value to those able to acquire sovereignty. 
This paper will be divided into three chapters. Chapter One investigates the role of the 
media and public sentiment in society and the effect they have on government policy. It 
also reviews the internal and external factors that can have an impact on these relations. 
2 
Chapter One will also provide a general introduction into the political order and the 
media in China and Japan. Chapter Two and Three will be presented in a similar 
the1natic format as Japan and China will be discussed, with Hong Kong included as part 
of the China chapter. Hong Kong is part of China, but still remains a liberal society with 
a media and public able to express opinion with much great freedom than the Chinese 
on the Mainland. Chapters Two and Three examine in greater depth the political order, 
the media in society, public sentiment and selected newspaper coverage of the dispute 
and the effect of this on Senkaku policy in China and Japan. Newspapers are to be used 
as they are the most accessible and practical media outlet. Chinese and Japanese 
language newspapers are the primary source along with the leading English language 
newspaper in each place as it reveals some differences to vernacular press content. 
Japanese and Chinese media coverage of the dispute and public op1n1on 1n each 
community has been quite different. Both governments have maintained basic foreign 
policy stances regarding the islands in the face of both domestic and international 
pressure to ease the situation and avoid heightened tensions. Due to the differing nature 
of democratic Japan and authoritarian China, the nature of this pressure has varied as 
factors influencing 'Senkaku policy' are affected by the different political orders of each 
country. 
Although extensive research has been conducted on the influence of the_ media and 
public sentiment on foreign policy in Western society, research about Asian countries 
has been quite limited. As an East Asian Studies degree this paper is not based on 
elaborate political science methodology but it does hope to offer some insight into the 
nature of the media-state-public sentiment relationship in China and Japan through a 
disciplined narrative account of the issues. 
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Public Sentiment, The Media and Foreign Policy 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the role of the media and public sentiment in society and its 
influence on foreign policy. Despite wide public recognition of the media's pervasive 
presence in modern society, its exact level of influence is difficult to ascertain. 
According to Wolfsfeld, it is 'impossible to assess precisely the degree of media 
influence in a given political conflict'. This is primarily due to the difficulty in 'isolating 
the news media from the other factors' that can have an effect. 1 
The media in many Asian countries, in contrast to their western counterparts, has been 
studied very little. Hence, much of the literature mentioned here is from Western 
sources. This chapter provides the reader with some basic insight into the role of the 
media and its function in China and Japan. It also examines Hong Kong as a liberal 
enclave in the People's Republic of China. Although without independent policy on 
foreign affairs and defence matters, Hong Kong is still basically an autonomous region 
that acts as a window into Chinese sentiment that cannot be openly expressed on the 
Mainland but can be expressed by the public and the press in Hong Kong. This chapter 
also reveals the different impact public sentiment and the media has on domestic and 
foreign policy and introduces the political order of China and Japan and the different 
influences on their respective government policies. Although the media's role in a 
political context varies according to a number of factors, if enough evidence and data is 
collected then an 'informed assessment about the extent of media influence' is possible.2 
1 G. Wolfsfeld. 'Media influence and political outcomes'. Media and Political Conflict. University Press, 
Cambridge, 1997, p. 71 . 
2 Ibid., p.73 . 
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Public Sentiment 
Public sentiment in society consists of a diversity of opinions and views as different 
groups actively expressing sentiment, vary in size, influence and intensity. Pressure 
groups exist along with other organisations such as business groups with a variety of 
interests ranging from economic and environmental to political and military. These 
groups reflect the variety of opinions within society and also vary in the impact they can 
have on the government process of policy formation as organisations with a greater 
financial base usually are more likely to have an influence on policy than those with less 
financial support. 
Public sentiment can be divided into a number of categories which vary according to the 
issue. Even within the scope of political sentiment, interest groups and individuals are 
usually more interested in domestic issues than foreign affairs. In Japan, the introduction 
of a goods and services tax and political scandals are more likely to arouse public 
sentiment than Hong Kong activists trying to land on an uninhabited rocky outcrop 
somewhere near Okinawa. Until strong anti-Japanese protests erupted, the islands were 
largely ignored by the Japanese media and unheard of by most J apanese.-0 In China, 
policy regarding state-owned enterprises is to be much more closely watched by the 
many who may lose their jobs than Japanese maritime activity in the East China Sea. 
Public sentiment 1s often controlled by successful government public relations that 
utilise the media to activate latent public opinion when necessary and ensure favourable 
support for government policy. This is done in ways that appeal to the majority of 
people and by addressing the norms and values that 'the public' are assumed to possess. 
The increase in active interest groups and greater public awareness of political issues, 
has led to the media and the government regarding public sentiment with caution as 'the 
public' is comprised of both valued press readers and voting constituents. However, 
3 S. Moffett. 'The right and its wrongs'. Far Eastern Economic Review. November 21, 1996, p.29. 
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with regard to foreign policy, public sentiment is usually latent, and much is required to 
not only stir sentiment but also to stimulate it. 
The general latency of public opinion on foreign policy issues causes decision-makers to 
be mostly concerned about the potential activation of public sentiment.4 To stimulate 
public interest, foreign policy issues must receive major n1edia coverage that is 
compatible with public frames of reference. In order to stay actively interested in an 
issue, the public must be able to relate directly to it. An example in the Senkaku dispute 
is the Chinese and Hong Kong press feeding on existing anti-Japanese sentiment. 
However, the issue must also be able to warrant intense media coverage for long enough 
to arouse public sentiment and convince media outlets that the issue continues to be 
newsworthy. What can cause an intrusion of public sentiment on the formation of 
foreign policy? 
Although most foreign affairs issues are often ignored by the public, major issues such 
as the threat of military conflict are usually able to arouse the public, especially if there 
is a direct challenge to the sovereignty of a nation or nationalist pride. Another 'threat ' 
to uninhibited foreign policy formation is the 'lightning rod effect', whereby a particular 
incident incites a sharp public response and intense media coverage. An example of this 
'effect' wa the Senkaku 'Lighthouse Incident ' in July 1996 that was fuelled by an 
' attempted illegal entry' into Japan by Chinese protestors and the death of one. 5 As 
stated in The I apan Times: 
Nothing unites international political thinking in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and Macau like any gesture by Japan that smacks of territorial expansion 
and revival of 'militarism' .6 
It is usually only in extreme circumstances that the public may have an impact on 
foreign policy. However, even then, government public relations personnel are often 
able to ensure sentiment i mo tly favourable and supportive of government policy. The 
Gulf War in 1991 is an example, as although the war posed no direct threat to US 
so ereignty, the US government received a majority of domestic support for its foreign 
-+ P.J. Powlick and A.Z. Katz. 'Foreign policy, public opinion and the media'. Mershon International 
Studies Review. Vol. 42, 1998 , p.29. 
5 G. Austin. The Mass Media and CSCAP. Discussion paper, 1998, p .8 . 
6 
'Much ado about a bunch of rocks ' . The Japan Times. September 14, 1996, p.19. 
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policy particularly from the media who 'supported the Gulf War policy almost without 
. ' 7 exception . 
The expression of public sentiment over foreign policy issues although less likely than 
over domestic issues, is still cause for government concern. In the case of this dispute, 
there has been some fear of an escalation in tension into a military conflict as expressed 
in The Economist, which asked, 'are East Asia's two great rivals, China and Japan, 
heading for a punch up?' 8 Respective governments have however managed to give the 
dispute a relatively low profile despite the issue involving potentially explosive 
elements and the threat of military action. In instances when latent opinion emerges, 
governments must adopt strategies to deal with this, such as public relations campaigns 
to influence the public and mobilise favourable support for policy. Although 
governments are usually able to manipulate public sentiment on foreign issues, there are 
circumstances in which sentiment can influence policy. 
The Role of the Media in Society 
The role of the media has evolved with the creation of new media, as penetration of 
these into society has increased, and as social patterns and levels of education for 
acquiring information have changed. Previously in liberal democratic societies, the press 
was regarded as impartial and more a source of information than influence_. However, 
attitudes to media influence have changed and the press is deemed by both the public 
and government as having much potential influence and 'enormous power' . This 
however is tempered by the media's own market driven agenda as a group of 
commercial companies that 'must make profits' .9 Through a variety of media outlets , 
the 'market agenda' ensures that society is constantly bombarded in one form or another 
with news , entertainment and information. 
Media in liberal democratic societies, including Japan and Hong Kong, can be 
influenced by four main groups: First the editorial staff, as journalists strive to provide 
informative material based on perceived public needs and public interests; second, 
7 W.A. Dorman In S. Iyengar and R. Reeves (eds). Do the Media Govern ? Sage publications, London, 
1997, p.121. 
8 
'Troubled waters'. The Econoni ist. October 12, 1996, p.29 . 
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newspaper proprietors with individual interests based on econorruc or political 
persuasion; third advertisers, because as market pressure intensifies, the need increases 
for revenue raised by advertisements; and fourth the government, as a powerful 
institution able to regulate the media and provide financial support and information. 
Each group depending on the issue usually have different viewpoints and work to 
influence and manipulate media content in accordance with their own needs and goals. 
The 1nedia has become a primary source of definitions and i1nages of social reality for 
individuals, groups and societies, as values and judgements are expressed in the media 
and mixed closely with entertainment and news. 10 The media has the ability to arouse 
senti1nent and inspire action through the images and news it conveys. According to 
Mc Quail, it is the 'mobilising effect on citizen attitudes and behaviours' of the media 
that plays a very important role. 11 Media influence in the political environment means 
that policy-makers are aware of the press as a 'double-edged sword'. Governments use 
the 1nedia to cultivate loyalty and support for them and their friends and also act 
hostilely towards designated enemies. However, in order to achieve this, governments 
must 'maintain the perception that media outlets are objective and print the facts' .12 The 
relationship between government policy, public opinion and the media have in many 
ways interlocked in a society with an increasingly educated population. 
The media is a primary source of information regarding foreign affairs to the majority of 
the public. Exposure to the media has the effect of 'broadening one's horizons and 
enhancing one's knowledge and interest in foreign affairs' .13 Until the latter years of the 
Vietnam War, the role of the press had been regarded primarily as a conveyor of 
information and fact. Policy-makers focused little on the need to work with the media 
which was largely seen to be supportive of the ruling elite, making decisions in the 
supposed best interests of a mostly apathetic public, which cared little for foreign issues. 
Media coverage of the Vietnam War was in many ways an important watershed in the 
evolution of the media worldwide in both democratic and non-democratic societies, and 
9 K. Goto. 'Freedom of speech, freedom of the press'. Look Japan. February 1997, p. l 0. 
10 D. McQuail. Mass Communication Theory. Sage Publications, London, 1987, p.1. 
11 Ibid., p.294. 
12 G. Austin. The Mass Media and CSCAP. Discussion paper, 1998, p.2. 
13 S.J. Pharr and E.S . Krauss. Media and Politics in Japan. University of Hawaii Press , Honolulu, 1996, 
p.293 . 
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in its relations with the government because for the first time, the carnage of war was 
captured on film and broadcast into homes via televsion. 
Media coverage of the Vietnam War revealed to the government and the public the 
instantaneous nature the media had suddenly developed and many believed that it was 
media influence and consequently public sentiment that changed American attitudes 
towards the war. However, studies have shown that it was divided elite consensus, 
including split opinions amongst policy-makers, that lead to intense and controversial 
media coverage that eventually become oppositional to US involvement and eventually 
resulted in the media for the first time being recognised as a contributing political 
factor. 14 As elite opinions continued to differ about the Vietnam War, and body bag 
numbers continued to rise, public opinion evolved into large-scale protests against the 
war. Although the power of public sentiment was revealed through mass demonstration, 
it was the policy-maker's inability to conform to established policy that led to media 
opposition and activated public opinion in the first place. 15 
The media's influence over government policy in democratic societies can be affected 
by the media's role as 'watchdog' or 'critic', as the press watches over policy-makers 
and 1nakes relevant criticism. 16 The media is also capable of playing two other roles in 
society; spectator (neutral), and servant of the state (generating support for the 
regiine). 17 However, because competitive commercial interests are also a factor in 
determining coverage in de1nocratic societies, the 'watchdog' role of the press may be 
undermined by market pressure, which often dictates more coverage of domestic issues 
than foreign affairs. These restrictions however, also limit public access to foreign 
policy and hence, decrease the likelihood of opinion activation and a public intrusion on 
foreign policy. Despite this, the press continues to try to maintain the image of a highly 
independent organisation providing its readership with a balanced range of news. 
14 D. Davis. 'Covering foreign affairs'. The Press and American Politics. Longman, New York, 1992, 
p.217. 
15 P.J . Powlick and A.Z. Katz. 'Foreign policy, public opinion and the media'. Mershon International 
Studies Review. Vol. 42, 1998, p.29. 
16 D. Davis . 'Covering public policy '. The Press and American Politics . Longman, New York, 1992, 
p.197. 
17 S.J. Pharr and E.S. Krauss. Media and Politics in Japan. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1996, 
p.5. 
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Commercial consideration is such that a criterion exists for determining which stories 
feature in print and which are ignored. In an increasingly market-oriented Japan and 
Hong Kong, the need to sell newspapers and continue to attract needed revenue from 
advertisers often contributes to content consideration. Most newspapers have a limited 
international news sections and priorities for coverage are based on the following, 
sensation value; sex (according to the public prominence of the people involved); 
violence (nu1nber dead or prominence of the people involved); crime (according to the 
scale); and politics (according to the shock value of the story). According to Austin, this 
is followed by 'national security or foreign policy, unless there is a sex, violence or 
cri1ne aspect to the story' which elevates the value of the article. Consequently, the 
editorial policies of all mass media outlets do not allow the audience to get any sort of 
comprehensive picture of foreign policy or security issues. 18 
The Political Order 
The nature of the relationship between sentiment, media and government policy depends 
greatly on the various domestic political structures which determine the degree of 
i1npact public opinion has on policy. 19 The political order of China, Japan and Hong 
Kong determine the function of their respective media outlets and permissible 
expression of public opinion. As the most democratic country in Asia, Japan has a 
thriving media, influenced by both the market and the government. Although generally 
regarded as a conservative nation in terms of the role of the media, the Japanese public 
have the ability to freely express sentiment and Japan maintains a liberal society with 
freedom of speech encouraged although conservative norms and cultural restrictions 
often cause a passive response to many events. 
As one of the last countries ruled by a communist party, China still remains 
authoritarian in the control it exercises over its people. Although since 1978, the country 
has undergone a dramatic liberalisation process, it still remains politically less 
transparent than liberal democratic societies, with efforts to keep the media and public 
expression under considerable restraint. The presence of public sentiment in China is 
18 Ibid., p.4. 
19 P.J. Powlick and A.Z. Katz. 'Foreign policy, public opinion and the media '. Mershon International 
Studies Review. Vol. 42, 1998, p.53. 
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less obvious and unable to be expressed to the same extent as in other places, and 
although the Chinese people are increasingly able to express their views, the 
government is still wary of opinion that criticises or threatens the regime. Although 
centrally controlled by Beijing and without independent defence or foreign policies , 
Hong Kong is a relatively autonomous society where freedom of the press and freedom 
of speech still exist despite a return to communist China in 1997. 
Government Policy and Media Influence 
The level of influence the press has on foreign policy is unclear. Despite this and the 
media changes that have taken place, including technological advances and more 
emphasis on the importance of the market, the media is acknowledged as a prominent 
entity in society. According to Deese, the most important recent development in the 
world of foreign policy is that the 'news media cannot be ignored' .20 The state-media 
relationship is one in which both parties are in many ways, dependent on the other. The 
nature of this relationship is also affected by other factors, but it is usually the issue 
itself which determines the response from policy-makers and the press with some issues 
1nore politically sensitive and of greater public interest than others. 
Foreign policy is influenced not just by the media or public sentiment, but also by a 
number of internal and external factors. These include econonlic security, -prosperity, 
physical security, ideology and the actions of other states. The actions of other states can 
create a 'lightning rod effect', as one incident can generate sudden and intense 
expression of opinion which can ~hen create problems for policy-makers. Intense media 
coverage can mobilise concentrated sentiment demanding an immediate government 
response, or sentiment may soon dissipate as the story becomes dated and readers lose 
interest, causing commercial consideration to take over and the issue is abandoned. 
In each country, the influence of media on policy is dependent on four main factors, in 
accordance with the respective political order: First the type of policy, as domestic 
policy is usually more likely to stimulate debate than foreign policy; second, the issue 
itself will determine much of the ensuing coverage and debate, such as the controversy 
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of a territorial dispute or the possibility of military conflict, which are likely to arouse 
much interest and concern. Third, the media outlet which determines the intensity of 
coverage that may vary between visual footage and graphic detail or conservative print, 
affecting the public 's response; and fourth the time frame has to be considered because 
coinciding events such as related events taking place such as anniversaries may add to 
the controversy and increase and prolong media coverage, or 1nedia coverage may 
decline as other stories compete for attention and the public and protestors lose interest 
as the issue subsides. 
An exa1nple of the importance of the 'time frame' was indicated in Hong Kong, 
Septe1nber 1996, as a 'protect the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands' demonstration coincided 
with the 65th anniversary of the Peking Bridge Incident (which lead to the Japanese 
invasion of China). Such a stirring of anti-Japanese sentiment provided an ideal chance 
for baodiao (protect the Diaoyu Islands) protesters to gain greater support from the local 
community and gave the Chinese media, such as the Renminribao, an opportunity to 
attack Japan. 21 
If the media is able to have some impact on foreign policy, to what extent is the role of 
public opinion important? Powlick and Katz declare that regardless of the political 
order, public attitudes to foreign policy are 'stable, coherent' and 'formed by core 
values' .22 It is these core values that governments address in order to mobilise and 
control public opinion and gain support for policies. In the region, the Chinese media is 
1nostly state-controlled and in Japan the press is often dependent on the government for 
access to printable information as governments attempt to manipulate opinion and as 
Austin notes, 'the domestic 1nedi.a' .23 The level of media impact on foreign policy is 
restricted by market pressures, domestic structures and reliance in many instances, on 
official sources. As Young and Jesser state, 'effective and efficient government cannot 
be achieved without some degree of secrecy in areas such as defence and foreign 
20 D. Deese (ed.). The New Politics of American Foreign Policy. St.Martin's Press, New York, 1994, 
p.185 . 
21 Renniinribao. 'Zailishijiaoxunjichushangjiaqiangrizhongguanxi '. September 19, 1996, p.6. 
22 P.J. Powlick and A.Z. Katz. 'Defining the American public opinion/ foreign policy nexus '. Mershon 
International Studies Review. Vol. 42, 1998, p.30. 
23 G. Austin. The Mass Media and CSCAP. Discussion paper, 1998, p .3. 
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affairs' .24 This ensures that the government is usually able to determine foreign policy 
unrestricted by sentiment. Did the Senkaku dispute challenge the government's ability to 
assume policy determination without interference in China and Japan? 
The modern media, with its dynamic immediacy and ubiquitous nature, has forced 
governments to realign themselves with a new order that is reflected in the 'enormous 
importance political strategists place on media coverage' .25 As Pharr and Krauss note, it 
is an understanding of the mass media that has become 'an integral part of the analysis 
of 1nodern politics' .26 An increasingly aware public has also contributed to such 
changes, with greater public access to a wider range of information sources leading to a 
higher proportion of the public with opinions on foreign affairs issues. These opinions 
however, are formulated mostly by the press, which devotes less time to foreign affairs 
in co1nparison to domestic policy and stories that appeal to the majority of readers. If the 
media wants to attract a wider readership then 'entertainment becomes a criteria for 
action', however this often leads to a decline in media quality, possibly even 
reputation27 and affects the level of media influence on foreign policy. 
Newspapers and the Senkaku Dispute 
Media coverage of the Senkaku dispute will be conducted through selected newspapers. 
Although the electronic media has brought about great change to the role of t)Je media in 
society, newspapers are still regarded as more credible sources of information and as 
McQuail suggests, 'in general retain some aura of seriousness and high cultural value' 
and are expected to present a more real and accurate account of events than the 
audiovisual 1nedia. 28 Furthermore, newspapers are a more accessible primary source to 
be analysed in contrast to the electronic media, which is less open to analysis as stories 
compete for limited time slots in a relatively short broadcast service. Newspapers offer 
more in-depth analysis of events because depending on the political persuasion of the 
paper, articles and editorials may vary slightly in opinion. As indicated in the 
24 P. Young and P. Jesser. The Media and the Military: from the Crimea to Desert Strike. Macmillian, 
Australia, 1997,p.10. 
25 R. Tiffen. News and Power. Allen & Unwin Australia, North Sydney, 1989, p.73. 
26 S.J. Phan and E.S. Krauss. Media and Politics in Japan. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1996, 
p.5. 
27 K. Goto. 'Freedom of speech, freedom of the press'. Look Japan. February 1997, p.11. 
28 D. McQuail. Mass Communication Theory. Sage Publications, London, 1987, p.21. 
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Renminribao, the liberal and conservative mainstream newspapers in Japan provided 
readers with differing views on the Japanese government's handling of the dispute. 29 
Examining the dispute through the media provides insight into some expressions of 
sentiment by selected groups within Chinese and Japanese society. Since 1978, it has 
been the actions of protest groups that have created the bulk of the excitement 
surrounding the dispute and provided the media with entertaining material. It is these 
protest groups, of ultranationalist origin in Japan and of anti-Japanese sentiment in 
China that have provided the press with newsworthy copy and, depending on the degree 
of coverage, has led to newspaper commentary on respective government's Senkaku 
policies and even expressed public sentiment. Although the media is difficult for one 
group to control, it presents 'tantalising opportunities' as a resource by which protest 
groups can 'transform their concerns into part of the agenda of policy-makers' .30 The 
mass media enables protest movements to gain greater support and thereby attempt to 
influence the government although without public support, interest groups including the 
1nedia itself, are unlikely to have much impact on government policy. 
The Media in the Region 
The diversity of the media in China, Japan and Hong Kong is reflected in the style of 
reporting, content, internal and external pressures and the role the press is ~xpected to 
play. What is accepted and understood in democratic Japan as standard media practice, 
differs greatly from authoritarian China. 31 In the region, historical and cultural values 
are often used by the media to stir public sentiment and gain support for the ruling elite. 
The Chinese media are constantly tapping into anti-Japanese sentiment, with prolonged 
1nedia focus on Japanese war atrocities and the continual 'failure' by the Japanese 
govern1nent to apologise adequately for their past as the war against Japan has been 
made into a 'symbol of the genesis of the modern Chinese people' .32 
29 Renminribao. 'Rixinglunpipingxicunpoihairizhongguanxidaju'. May 8, 1997, p.6. 
30 S.J. Pharr and E.S. Krauss. Media and Politics in Japan. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1996, 
p.219. 
31 B. Womack (ed.). Media and the Chinese Public: a survey of the Beijing media audience. M.E. 
Sharpe, New York, 1986, p.7. 
32 H. Arai. 'Angry at China? Slam Japan'. Far Eastern Economic Review. October 3, 1996, p.21. 
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The Japanese media has long claimed itself to be the 'opposition party' in Japanese 
politics, which was dominated since 1955 until 1993 by the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP). In Japan, the press is held in much higher regard by the public than its 
western counterparts. As Pharr and Krauss reveal, both media, newspapers and 
television, 'enjoy' far greater credibility and prestige in Japan with a 'vast following', 
more so than most other countries.33 However, they also have a unique relationship 
with the government, sometimes acting as an unofficial opposition party and at other 
times as a strict medium of government sanctioned information. 
The structure and function of the Chinese press is 'fundamentally different from those of 
the West' and this needs to be understood in order to put the 'Chinese media audience 
into context' .34 Despite increasing diversity in the Chinese press and much popularity 
gained by less party-oriented dailies, particularly evening newspapers, the government 
still attempts to control and carefully monitor public comment on issues that challenge 
the authority of the ruling elite. In contrast, the Hong Kong press is liberal and 
competitive and despite being more cautious under Chinese rule, still provides its 
audience with diverse and varied news sources and opinions. In Hong Kong, although 
newspapers have been regarded as some of the most liberal in Asia, they are 
increasingly forced to jeopardise standards and credibility as market and other pressures 
force them to lower standards and aim for a wider target audience. 35 In China, the press 
although still carefully monitored by the Chinese government in Beijing as -~servant of 
the state', is currently more independent than ever before with a decentralising of power 
and a greater emphasis on liberalisation.36 
Newspapers can reveal a great diversity of opinion even within mainstream society. The 
newspapers chosen for this thesis, although all major dailies, differ slightly in reputation 
and perceived political inclination. The media is also regarded as being able to 'set the 
public agenda' 37 and provide policy challengers the opportunity to achieve political 
goals. Newspapers reveal the nature of such struggles as in the case of the Senkaku 
33 S.J. Pharr and E.S. Krauss. Media and Politics in Japan. University of Ha'Waii Press, Honolulu , 1996, 
p.5. 
34 B. Womack (ed. ). Media and the Chinese Public: a survey of the Beijing media audience. M.E. 
Sharpe, New York, 1986, p.7 . 
35 F. Ching. 'Learning self-control'. Far Eastern Economic Review. December 17 , 1998, p.24. 
36 L . Jin. 'Baxianguohai , meitijizhan '. Huaxiawenzhai. March 1999 (internet). 
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dispute. However, much newspaper opinion is implicit as journalists acknowledge the 
cultural understanding of readers or do not wish to make open inferences on certain 
topics. 38 For this reason significant differences in editorial policy can often be disguised 
by newspapers with the use of certain terms or the omission of selected information. 
Japan, China and Hong Kong all have popular English language newspapers for foreign 
audiences both local and abroad. The function of such papers is often to provide 
'foreigners' with selected, sanctioned information which usually differs fro1n vernacular 
press content. This is of particular interest in China, whereby through newspaper 
analysis, both English language and vernacular, China-watchers have gained a better 
understanding of the Chinese government as foreign analysts of closed regimes have 
often used the press as an indicator of government policy and political activity. 39 In such 
analysis, omitted information is usually more revealing than officially published news. 
This makes the Chinese press useful in commenting on policy shifts and adjustments 
and with greater media liberalisation in China, can also reveal differing elite opinion on 
government policy. 
The role of the media and the function it serves varies according to the cultural and 
political structure of a society. McQuail claims that it is because mass communication is 
so intertwined with the total life of a national society that it is 'strongly influenced by 
the immediate circumstances of culture and historical events' .40 The press ~verywhere 
claim to be constantly striving to serve the best interests of the public, including in 
countries where the media is a mere extension of authoritarian regimes that tolerate no 
dissent and prohibit freedom of speech. In most democracies, the press, although 
relatively free to report and distribute, is restricted not only by market competition but 
also the need to provide news that 'does not confront prejudices' .41 Media outlets that 
challenge the beliefs of readers will lose circulation and hence financial revenue. The 
media in an authoritarian regime is mostly unaffected by market demands due to the 
financial support received from the government, however the media remains little more 
37 G. Wolfsfeld. Media and Political Conflict. 'Media influence and political outcomes'. 
University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p.66. 
38 T. Van dijk. News Anaylsis: case studies of international and national news in the press. 
University of Amsterdam, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, New Jersey, 1988, p.11 . 
39 W. Mills. 'Treatment of foreign policy issues in the regional Chinese press' . Asian Survey . Vol.xxi , 
no.7, July 1981, p.795. 
40 D. McQuail. Mass Conimunication Theory. Sage Publications, London, 1987, p.8. 
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than a 'propaganda mouthpiece' and a 'party organ' .42 In this way, Chinese newspapers 
differ greatly from those in Japan and Hong Kong which although prey to market forces 
have more independent editorial policy. 
Study of the media in Japan, China and Hong Kong provides access not just to 
'information' but also some insight into society and government. Media examination of 
both Japan and China reveal government control to some extent and as W olsfeld notes, 
it is this 'level of political control' which also reveals the power authorities have to 
officially regulate the media which is 'blatant' in non-democratic societies, as the 
government owns most media outlets and dictates editorial comment.43 In both 
democratic and autocratic societies it is ultimately the government with the resources to 
control the 1nedia in most circumstances and nullify any effect it may have on policy. 
Japan 
The Japanese press is not only the most liberal in Asia, but also arguably the most 
pervasive in the world and regarded as the most influential group in Japanese society.44 
In a country where over 70 million newspapers are published daily at the world's 
highest per capita circulation rate of 581 copies to 1000 people, the Japanese press has a 
prestige unequalled in any other country.45 Despite such prestige and a relatively 
democratic system, the media-politics relationship in Japan is based on a mutual 
understanding whereby reporters are privy to official sources but restricted by the 
unofficial nature of the relationship.46 These Kisha Clubs allow the press access to high 
level sources and involve a close level of intimacy between the journalist and the source 
which is 'rarely questioned' and provides reporters with access to a 'great deal of inside 
information'. However, most of this information remains unexposed and a breach of this 
trust by way of publishing information without permission will result in the reporter 
being excluded from 'the club' and 'disconnected from the source' .47 
41 G. Austin. The Mass Media and CSCAP. Discussion paper, 1998, p.4. 
42 Ibid., p.4. 
43 G. Wolfsfeld . Media and Political Conflict. 'Media influence and political outcomes'. University Press, 
Cambridge, 1997, p .60. 
44 S.J. Pharr and E .S. Krauss . Media and Politics in Japan. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu , 1996, 
p.187. 
45 Ibid. , p.301. 
46 K.van Wolferen. The Enigma of Japanese Power. Vintage Books, New York, 1990, p.95 . 
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Despite high circulation, the media in Japan is regarded by international media 
observers as less influential than in other countries and the press in certain areas of 
Japanese political life is perceived to be a 'less significant' actor than it is in other 
industrialised nations' .48 The political nature of the Japanese press is such that despite a 
'watchdog' reputation, the media is still vulnerable to state intervention and self 
imposed restriction. In Japan, the majority of political exposure and major scoops are 
left up to the weekly magazines which will break a story initially, thus, enabling 
mainstream newspaper dailies to publish the story without having broken any 
confidence with official sources. The Lockheed Scandal in 1976 was one such incident 
where bribe taking by high-ranking figures was widely known, but it was not revealed 
publicly in major newspapers until the story was exposed in a weekly magazine and 
highly publicised in the US.49 
The three Japanese newspapers to be examined are: the Yomiuri Shimbun, regarded as 
the '1nouthpiece of the foreign ministry' and Japan's most conservative mainstream 
daily with a circulation of over 10 million copies; the Mainichi Shimbun, one of Japan's 
1nost liberal dailies with a circulation of over 4 million; The Japan Times, Japan's 
leading English language newspaper. 
China 
Analysis of Chinese media outlets is fundamentally different to the media analysis of 
den1ocratic societies. In the past, the Chinese press was mostly dominated by the Xinhua 
(New China) News Agency. The Agency, controlled by the Party, determined newspaper 
content and ensured party guidelines were followed as 'virtually all the articles 
published on foreign policy' c~me from one source - Xinhua. 50 This rigid control of 
Chinese media created a 'cautious journalistic style' more sensitive to the political 
weather than the public's 'informational needs or interests' .51 However, according to 
W 01nack, restrictions on the Chinese media have lessened since Mao as China's new 
47 B. Stronach. Beyond the Rising Sun: nationalism in contemporary Japan. Praeger Publishers, Westport, 
1995 , p.68. 
48 S.J. Pharr and E .S. Krauss. Media and Politics in Japan. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1996, 
p.22. 
49 K. van Wolferen. The Enigma of Japanese Power. Vintage Books, New York, 1990, p.137. 
50 W. Mills . 'Treatment of foreign policy issues in the regional Chinese press'. Asian Survey. Vol.xxi, 
no.7, July 1981, p.809. 
51
• B. Womack (ed.). Media and the Chinese Public: a survey of the Beijing media audience. M.E. 
Sharpe, New York, 1986, p.15 . 
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focus on economic modernisation has greatly affected all aspects of Chinese life 
including the media. The variety and quality of the media has changed greatly as it shifts 
away from the 'stodginess' of national party papers to local and more informal 
bl . · 52 pu 1cat1ons. 
The Chinese public now has much greater access to news and information. Recently, 
with the advent of the internet and a rise in imported written material through both 
official and unofficial channels, the Chinese government is finding it increasingly 
difficult to control the flow of information. The return of Hong Kong has further 
increased the flow of unrestricted information into China as the Hong Kong press is 
usually better informed than 'China's official mouthpieces' and the Chinese people are 
able to learn about themselves through information 'exported to Hong Kong and 
reimported back to China' .53 The liberalisation process in China is also affecting the 
media as the government relinquishes supreme control and decreases financial support 
as the media must justify its financial existence in the marketplace. 54 Although the 
Chinese press is still controlled by the government, the rigid control exercised by the 
government in the past is slowly diminishing as Beijing has less central authority. 
The three Chinese newspapers to be examined are: the Renminribao (The People's 
Daily), the '1nouthpiece' of the Chinese Communist Party55 with a circulation of over 
three 1nillion and regarded as the publication for western watchers of China to use for 
analysis of the regime;56 the Jiefangjunbao (Liberation Army Daily), the 'mouthpiece 
of the military', and published by the Peoples' Liberation Army as one of the few 
newspapers of large circulation figures that discusses foreign policy issues in China;57 
. 
The China Daily, China's leading English language daily monitored closely by Xinhua 
and established in 1981. 
52 Ibid ., p.14. 
53 J. Chan and C. Lee. The Hong Kong Press in China's Orbit. Guilford Press, New York, 1991, p.147. 
54 L . Jin . 'Baxianguohai, meitijizhan'. Huaxiawenzhai. March 1999 (internet). 
55 B . Womack (ed.). Media and the Chinese Public: a survey of the Beijing media audience. M .E. 
Sharpe, New York, 1986, p.6. 
56 N. D. Kristoff and S. WuDunn. China Wakes. Nicholas Brealey, Great Britain , 1994, p.410. 
57 L . Stenseth. 'Nationalism and Foreign Policy- the case of China's Nansha rhetoric' (thesis). Centre for 
Development and Environment, University of Oslo, 1998, p.55. 
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Hong Kong 
Despite the reversion to Chinese communist rule in July 1997, the former British colony 
of Hong Kong still offers perhaps the most dynamic media environment in Asia with 
press freedom second only to Japan. The press consists of pro-Hong Kong, pro-China 
and international newspapers, each vying for a share of the market and the chance to 
express their views in Asia's most vibrant community, with roles that encompass 
watchdog, spectator and servant of the state. Commercial consideration contributes to 
the co1npetitive nature of the Hong Kong press and although political interference is 
now 1nore a concern than in the past, the current threat to the Hong Kong media is 
caused more by declining quality due to fierce 1narket competition, than com1nunist 
intervention. 58 
Due to a lesser role in the dispute than China and Japan, only two Hong Kong 
newspapers are to be examined; the Mingpao, Hong Kong's leading intellectual 
newspaper and regarded as slightly left-wing; The South China Morning Post, the 
leading English language newspaper Hong Kong with an international reputation and 
previously regarded as the voice of the colonial establishment. 59 
Conclusion 
The level of influence the media and public sentiment has over foreign policy has been 
debated for many years. US television coverage of the Vietnam War revealed to the 
world the potential of a pervasive and highly influential media and initiated much debate 
about 1nedia influence over for~ign policy. The potential for media impacting on policy 
also varies as domestic and foreign policy issues are treated differently by both the 
government and the public. Domestic issues are more relevant to the daily lives of most 
people and consequently open to more scrutiny by the media and the public. Foreign 
events are _ usually less closely observed by the public due to less immediate impact and 
often irrelevance to daily living. Consequently, the government is often able to proceed 
with foreign policy formation and implementation unhindered by media or public 
influence. However, some issues such as the threat of military conflict or sovereignty 
58 F. Ching. 'Learning self-control' . Far Eastern Econ.omic Review. December 17, 1998, p.24. 
59 
'The perils of nationalism'. The Economist. September 21 , 1996, p.30. 
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disputes do engage considerable public interest and will often deviate from the usual 
pattern of policy formation. 
Although most people would acknowledge the power of the press and public opinion on 
many issues, in the domain of foreign policy the government is usually the dominant 
player. Formation of foreign policy is usually carried out by elites with little regard for a 
mostly unaware public. There are other factors which entrench the privileged position of 
the state in foreign policy. Firstly, media outlets serve a variety of purposes apart from 
public interest. Secondly, public opinion is rarely united on most issues. Thirdly, a 
competitive market and limited readership means that if elite consensus is not divided, 
followed by press saturation of a volatile issue, foreign policy is given limited coverage. 
It is only activated, latent public opinion on issues presented in familiar frameworks that 
may pose any threat to government policy. In certain situations foreign policy shifts may 
occur as a result of an incident provoking intense media coverage and vocal public 
sentiment that alter policy, if only gradually. 
The relationship between the media, public sentiment and foreign policy differs from 
country to country. Powerful insights into this relationship can be gained through the 
study of correlations between media coverage and changes in a state's foreign policy, 
however slight. Research on the Western press has been extensive, however little 
scholarly work is available on the workings of media outlets in Asia and their impact on 
the government and society. Japan and Hong Kong have the two most liberal press 
structures in Asia, whilst the Chinese media, although increasingly market oriented, is 
still subject to the fairly rigid control of an ageing communist regime. Each society is 
. 
unique and the role and influence of the press, despite its universal prominence, varies 
in the messages it carries and how it is perceived by both academics and the public. 
2 
Public Sentiment, The Media and Decision-Making on the 
Senkaku Dispute in Japan 
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The dispute over sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands has raised a number of sensitive 
issues in Japan, which on the surface appear powerful enough to mobilise public 
sentiment sufficiently for the media to affect foreign policy. The dispute deals with 
precarious Japanese relations with China involving elements of potential conflict, 
nationalism and wider concerns about North East Asian stability. This chapter examines 
the influence of the media and sentiment on foreign policy in Japan towards the 
Senkaku dispute. This examination involves a discussion of the relationships between 
the Japanese government and media. The political order of Japan, mentioned in the 
previous chapter is expanded upon. The effect of the media on foreign policy in Japan 
will be addressed by examining the various internal and external factors which influence 
the process of policy formation in Japan. The relationship these two parties have to each 
other and to the public is also an extension of the general introduction to the Japanese 
media provided in Chapter One. 
This chapter analyses the coverage of the Senkaku dispute in three mainstream Japanese 
newspapers since the 'Lighthouse Incident' in July 1996. The significance of the 
'Lighthouse Incident' is, as noted in the Mainichi that it caused a 'lightning rod effect' 
and brought to the surface strong public sentiment: 
Eighteen years after the signing of the peace and friendship treaty between 
Japan and China, the lighthouse incident, 'in one breath ' created a 
heightened anti-Japanese mood on the Mainland, in Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
60 
Although as previously mentioned, this analysis might have exa1nined more newspapers 
or other media, such as television or magazines, this thesis should provide the reader 
some insight into Japanese Senkaku policy and the effect on it of public sentiment in 
Japan. 
60 Mainichi Shimbun . 'Ryodomondaiokojiraseruna' (editorial). September 22, 1996, p.5 . 
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The Political Order in Japan 
As one of the most liberal democratic countries in Asia and with a political system 
modelled on the US system, one would expect the influence of public sentiment and 
media coverage on policy decision making in Japan to be relatively strong. After the 
humiliation of defeat in World War II, Japan's political system was remoulded after 
seven years of Allied occupation, as wartime militarism was replaced by a US imposed 
constitution, and democratic foundations were established including a new open press. 
Freedom of the press was seen as a vital part of the new democratic Japan and continues 
to be regarded as thus. After World War II, the Japanese government adapted quickly to 
these new democratic structures and the task of rebuilding and strengthening the country 
was undertaken and achieved with unprecedented speed as the Japanese press provided 
an i1nportant forum for discussion and information. 
The effect of the media and sentiment on foreign policy in Japan is influenced by the 
long-standing one-party structure. With the exit of the occupation troops in 1951, one 
party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), came to dominate Japanese politics. The 
LDP focused on economic development with a strong majority rule as opposition parties 
floundered in disunity. From the advent of this 'new' Japan in 1955 until 1993, one-
party control created a press often prone to acting as an unofficial opposition party. The 
Japanese press has often been regarded as not just a 'watchdog' but also as the 
'functional equivalent of opposition parties in industrial democracies' .61 The lack of 
political contest enabled most policies of the LDP to remain unchallenged and 
successful economic improvement assisted the continuation of the political domination. 
Between 1946 and 1976 there was a fifty-five fold increase in the Japanese 
economy.62 The ruling party encouraged hard work and sacrifice for the greater good 
of a stronger Japan and as Mc Veigh notes, economic policy was 'designed under the 
banner of nationalism' and the world market was viewed as something to be 
'conquered' .63 
61 S.J. Pharr and E .S.Krauss. Media and Politics in Japan. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1996, 
p .19. 
62 B.J. McVeigh. The Nature of the Japan ese State. Routledge, London , 1998, p.71. 
63 Ibid. , p.72. 
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This policy of economic development enabled the LDP to rule uncontested for over 40 
years. However, in 1993, a culmination of continued scandals,64 the end of the Cold War 
and the emergence of Japan as an economic superpower with an increased need for 
successful international diplomacy, led to an end of the LDP' s unchallenged rule. 
Although still in power, a series of coalition governments have left the ruling party more 
vulnerable to factional disagreement. Consequently, Japanese foreign policy is now 
moving towards a greater openness. 
The ruling party in Japan has legitimised itself through economic success and insulated 
foreign policy from most external influences. The LDP and subsequent coalitions have 
maintained power and justified actions over the years through proven economic success, 
prosperity and general harmony. Since 1945, pacifist tendencies in Japanese society 
have played a prominent role in the formation of public opinion and consequently 
foreign and domestic policy-making. The Japanese press has played a role as the 'single 
greatest presence in the monitoring of politicians, government departments and also the 
corporate sector'. 65 Japanese stability over the last five decades has been a focal point of 
policy and reinforced by a watchful press. 
The influence of the Japanese government over the media and the public is greatly 
enhanced by the successful teaming of the public and private sectors.66 These 
departments are the place of policy decisions and of great residing power in Japan as 
government ministers are more instruments for policy implementation than creators of 
policy. Japanese economic policy after the war led to not only dramatically improved 
living standards but also the mobilisation of 'Japan Inc', regarded worldwide as a 
highly successful combined public and private business enterprise. Many have argued 
that it is the bureaucrats that effectively dominate the 'iron triangle' of Japan, consisting 
of 'businessmen, the bureaucracy and politicians' 67 and create a combined authority that 
enabled the government to influence the media. 68 The Japanese government has the 
64 S .J. Pharr and E.S . Krauss. Media and Politics in Japan. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1996, 
p.134 . 
65 M. Uchida. 'Japan's newspaper disease'. Tokyo Business Today. March 1992, p.22. 
66 K.van Wolferen . The Enigma of Japanese Power. Vintage Books, New York, 1990, p.44. 
67 S E.M. Charlton. Comparing Asian Politics: India, China and Japan. Westview Press, Colorado , 1997, 
p.257. 
68 S.J. Pharr and E.S.Krauss. Media and Politics in Japan. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1996, 
p.13. 
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ability to initiate downward pressure on the media and consequently the public , which 
assists the government with the reinforcing of its support for its foreign policies. 
Insulated foreign policy in Japan is made increasingly difficult by Japan's economic 
superpower status. As this status increases, so to do the number of public and political 
voices calling for a more assertive Japanese foreign policy as Japan moves out of the 
shadow of the US with a desire to expand its role. Huo states that the direction of 
Japan's new policy, is a result of both 'external pressure' and 'internal awakening', 
externally influenced by the end of the Cold War and pressure from the US and 
internally influenced by a growing nationalism as many Japanese advocate for a more 
'politically and internationally significant role' for J apan.69 
To secure legitimacy and popular support in Japan, the government must maintain the 
stability and prosperity that the Japanese people have become accustomed to, which is 
increasingly reliant on continued economic success. Asia has become an important trade 
centre for Japan with bilateral relationships enhanced by foreign aid, investment and 
trade. 7° Changed economic circumstances in Asia have affected the region as it has been 
transformed from a third world environment to a flourishing economic domain. Foreign 
policy towards the region has been influenced and shaped by Japan's increasing 
dependency on Asian markets to sell products and provide inexpensive labour for major 
Japanese companies. 
Foreign policy based on pragmatic domestic concerns and broader economic needs is 
usually immune to the demands of interest groups, particularly those deviating from 
mainstream public opinion. The success of the Japanese economy is regarded as a major 
priority and harmonious relations with neighbours that avoid confrontation are an 
important aspect of Japanese foreign policy. Especially in the case of China, as it 
provides Japanese companies with a large market close-by which is also increasing in 
both military and economic prowess. To ensure continued prosperity, relations with 
neighbours such as China are important and Japanese foreign policy reflects this. The 
Senkaku dispute however, reveals pressures on the Japan-China relationship both 
69 H.L. Huo, 'Japan and China: collaborators or rivals?' In W . Hunsberger (ed.) . Japan 's Quest: The 
search for international role, recognition and respect. M.E. Sharpe, 1997, p .1 57 . 
70 R.Taylor. Greater China and Japan: prospects for an economic partnership in East Asia. Routledge, 
London, 1997, p.16. 
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internally and externally with regular Chinese government allegations of revived 
Japanese nationalism. 
The Media in Japanese Society 
The Japanese media's prevalence is enhanced by its penetration into Japanese society as 
the Japanese people as a nation read more newspapers than any other country. 71 The 
current Japanese media has its origins dating back to the Meiji Restoration of the late 
1860s. The press began as a forum for debate and its presence contributed to the 
creation of the modern Japanese-state as for the next half-century, the press remained a 
vibrant and idealistic identity. However, the competitive and idealist role of the media in 
Japan was greatly affected by the rise of Japanese militarism in the 1930s. Opposition to 
leading militarists was crushed, and the press became part of the propaganda machine, 
extolling war and glory for the land of the Rising Sun. 
The defeat of the Japanese Empire and the militaristic regime in 1945, combined with 
democratic laws introduced by the occupation forces to convert the media once again 
into a forum of liberal discussion. The new constitution formed by the US in 1947, set 
guidelines for Japanese society that included securing a free press and establishing a 
democratic political structure. However, Pharr and Krauss reveal that although the 
constitution ensured 'freedom of the press' in Japan and created an open _environment 
for the media to operate in, patterns and conventions of reporting have sometimes 
restricted the flow of information to the Japanese public. 72 
The structure of the media-government relationship is unique. An understanding of 
the Kisha Uournalist) Club system and its relationship with the government is 'crucial 
to an understanding of the Japanese media' .73 As discussed in Chapter One, some 
Japanese newspaper journalists are members of Kisha Clubs and are invited to press 
conferences where they are given the opportunity to form ' intimate ' relations with 
government 
71 S.J. Pharr and E.S.Krauss. Media and Politics in Japan. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu , 1996, 
p.4. 
72 Ibid., p.12. 
73 Ibid ., p.65. 
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officials.74 However, as Uchida explains, despite 'ready access to information' there are 
'evils involved,' dependence on official announcements force journalists to rely on 
government sources and reporters constantly fear a loss of access, causing a tendency to 
'cater to the authorities'. 75 Being accessible to such sources also greatly restricts the 
ability to publish certain material because if information is printed without first 
receiving government permission, journalists face expulsion from the club and are 
removed from the source. McVeigh comments that such is the 'homogenised nature' of 
the Japanese press that the media's function is similar to that in a socialist country.76 
Despite a degree of government influence, the Japanese media is also affected by 
com1nercial consideration. Recently, the prestigious reputation of the Japanese press,77 
is currently facing changes brought on by economic downturn and a trend towards more 
market oriented content. It has also for some time faced criticism by conservatives for 
being a 'leftist apologist' and by liberals as being an 'establishment apologist' .78 Pharr 
and Krauss comment on the dual personality of the Japanese media as it can be both 
'guardian of public interest' and 'tool of the government' .79 This is reflected in the 
1nainstream Japanese press which consist of newspapers that both support and challenge 
the government. 
As mentioned in Chapter One, four main groups can influence the composition of 
newspaper content, as each group wants their say represented in the structure and 
presentation of the paper: First the editorial staff, consisting of editors and journalists, 
are responsible for the wording of articles, their strategic placement and interested in 
information flow for the public good and acting in Japan as the 'upholders of public 
morality' ;80 Second, newspaper proprietors interested in selling papers and making 
profits place increasing pressure on journalists in Japan to 'make newspapers that sell', 
not 'sell newspapers they make' ;81 Third, the advertisers as a major source of newspaper 
74 B.Stronach. Beyond the Rising Sun; nationalism in contemporary Japan. Praeger, Westport, 1995, 
p.69 . 
75 M. Uchida. 'Japan 's newspaper disease' . Tokyo Business Today. March 1992, p.21. 
76 B. J. McVeigh. The Nature of the Japanese State . Routledge, London , 1998, p.65. 
77 S.J. Pharr and E.S.Krauss. Media and Politics in Japan. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1996, 
p.5. 
78 J.B. Lee. The Political Character of the Japanese Press . Seoul National University Press, 1985, p.166. 
79 S.J. Pharr and E.S.Krauss . Media and Politics in Japan. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1996, 
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80 Ibid ., p.138. 
81 Ibid., p.139. 
27 
revenue in Japan place pressure on the newspaper to achieve high circulation figures to 
enable the widest possible range of advertising to take place; 82 Fourth, the Japanese 
government is a key primary source of information and acts through the use of press 
releases and the need to manipulate, mobilise and when possible, selectively inform the 
public at times with 'a degree of uniformity and precision that even the former Soviet 
Union failed to achieve' .83 Of these four groups, it is ultimately the government with the 
greatest influence. 
In the Senkaku dispute, each of these four groups that attempt to influence media 
content have a different agenda. The editorial team may be interested in informing the 
public of an issue regarding Japanese sovereignty and tension with close neighbours. 
Proprietors may see this as a story to provide exciting copy with conflict, stand-offs and 
even death (the drowning of Hong Kong activist David Chan). Advertisers may see such 
'exciting' conflict as an opportunity for more papers to be sold and a larger target 
audience to be reached. Finally, the government may try to ensure the issue is kept low 
profile to restrict the level of public intrusion on foreign policy formation as rightists are 
not publicly encouraged or supported, yet the government stands firm and the Chinese 
government are portrayed as the antagonistic. The leader of the ultranationalist group 
behind the lighthouse construction in July 1996, Toyohisa Eto claims, 'The Japanese 
media make fun of me, so I don't talk to them anymore'. 84 If mainstream media look 
down upon such groups, the Japanese government need not fear ultrarightists receive 
positive publicity and support from within the community. 
These considerations can affect the content of the newspapers, public op1n1on and 
consequently the level of media influence on foreign policy. Foreign affairs issues more 
likely to gain coverage are those with 'excitement value'. The Senkaku dispute has 
provided this, with confrontation on the 'high sea' with Chinese protestors more likely 
to grab the attention of readers than the peaceful fishing settlements established with the 
Taiwanese during the dispute85 concerning fishing rights estimated at being worth 54,00 
tonnes and $1.5 billion. 86 Each of the three Japanese newspapers covered the fishing 
82 Ibid ., p.139. 
83 M. Uchida. Tokyo Business Today. 'Japan's newspaper disease'. March 1992, p.20. 
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agreement, however, media emphasis was placed on the Japanese flag burning incident 
in Taiwan and consulate sit-ins in Hong Kong, rather than bilateral attempts at peaceful 
resolution. 
Pressure on the press to highlight dramatic events and sensationalise is caused by an 
increasingly competitive market that editors and publishers must consider due to an 
econo1nic downturn. 87 As revealed in The Far Eastern Economic Review, the Japanese 
dailies have been facing a difficult recession as profits have fallen sharply and structural 
changes are being made. 88 The dispute has provided the media in Japan with 
controversy, tension with China and even the death of a protestor. However, is this 
enough to spark intense press coverage and mobilise public sentiment that can in turn 
influence the Senkaku policy of the Japanese government? 
Although the media in Japan tries to influence the public, it is also in some ways 
restricted by public opinion and attitudes. The press in Japan is increasingly dependent 
on its readership and its ability to influence foreign policy is subsequently affected by 
this dependence. Newspapers are aware of a growing need by the public to not just be 
informed, but also to be entertained. Even conservative papers such as the Yonziuri are 
being forced to adhere more to external forces such as advertisers. 89 As a consequence, 
to obtain a healthy readership, the Japanese media is faced with a difficult situation; the 
need commercially to not only entertain, but also to balance this with the need to 
maintain credibility. However, if an outlet wants to attract more viewers and readers, 
then 'entertainment value' becomes an important criterion for action, which causes the 
quality of articles to decline and leads to audience distrust.90 
Japan's Senkaku Policy 
Japanese foreign policy regarding island sovereignty according to Prime Minister 
Hashimoto and the LDP' s pre-election platform, was announced in the Mainichi to be 
'firm' and that the islands clearly belonged to Japan. 91 Japanese ownership has been 
87 K. Goto. 'Freedom of speech, freedom of the press '. Look Japan. February, 1997, p.11. 
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mostly undisputed since the Japanese government began expressing an interest in 
'acquiring sovereignty' in 1885.92 The Japanese claim that the islands officially became 
part of Japan in January 1895, three months before the signing of the Shimonoseki 
Treaty which signified the end of the Sino-Japanese War, resulting in complete victory 
to Japan and the annexation of Taiwan along with other war booty. Until a United 
Nations team indicated the possibility of oil and gas deposits beneath the islands after 
tests were conducted in 1967-6993 , neither China nor Taiwan had protested much about 
Japanese ownership or US use of the islands as 'live-bombing ranges' .94 
The Japanese Foreign Ministry continues to state that Japan has sovereignty over the 
islands and that they are part of 'Japan's indigenous territory'. 95 The Japanese Foreign 
Minister stated in the Yoniiuri: 
The Chinese have been emphasising sovereignty only since the 1970s, but 
both historically and legally the islands belong to J apan.96 
It is this difference in perceived ownership that has much impact on the Senkaku 
policies as the Japanese and Chinese government both attempt to defend their claims. 
This difference is reflected in newspaper coverage as the Japanese government acts 
defensively and the Chinese government offensively as the Chinese try to acquire 
sovereignty over islands they do not control. The 'firm' stance taken by the Japanese 
government, co1nbined with their failure to remonstrate the actions of the Japanese 
ultranationalists, has greatly angered the Chinese. The Chinese government has 
expressed repeated dissatisfaction with the Japanese government's failure to condemn 
outright the actions of ultrarightist groups and for not taking 'effective measures to stop 
harming Sino-Japanese relations' .97 This has been supported by Japanese newspapers, in 
articles from the Mainichi and The Japan Times critical of the Japanese government. 
The Japanese Senkaku policy was affected by a number of other factors. The visit of 
Prime Minister Hashimoto to the infamous Japanese Y asukuni Shrine for the war-dead 
in July 1996, angered many in Asia, not least the Chinese. It also had an effect on the 
92 G.Austin. China 's Ocean Frontier. Allen and Unwin, Australia. 1998, p.169 . 
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dispute as it was regarded in the Mainichi as having made the problem 'more 
complicated'. 98 This incident combined with the Japanese government amending the 
defence treaty with the US in April 1966 as noted in the Mainichi, which added to 
tension with China.99 Because the dispute was tainted by other events, it is difficult to 
isolate the media's affect on Senkaku policy as other pressures affect not only 
government policy but also the media. 
Japanese foreign policy formation is also influenced by a need for physical security. The 
April 1996 Tokyo Summit on defence with the US, strengthened Japan's resolve 
regarding the dispute as the US indicated it would support Japan in a military conflict 
with China over the islands. 100 This commitment to 'defend the islets' reiterated an 
earlier commitment made by the US in 1974 101 which was mentioned in the Mainichi in 
October 1996. 102 This joint commitment to regional security came only a month after 
the Taiwan missile crisis, in March of that year. Secured military commitment from the 
US also angered the Chinese who in the Renminribao declared the treaty to be one 
aimed at 'containing China' .103 
The Japanese adopted a policy of firmly defending the islands and Japan's territorial 
waters. As Zhang states, 'Japan appeared adamant during the heated tension with China 
in Septe1nber and October' [1996]. 104 Japan has done this with well-coordinated efforts 
by the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) to prevent Chinese protestors landing on the 
islands, having up to 60 vessels in one confrontation to repel the Chinese. This 
represents Japan's clear position on the islands. However, as questioned by an article in 
The Japan Tinies from the Singaporean Strait Times, what did such a show of force 
reveal about Japanese Senkaku-policy? 
If the government were not using the rightists as a proxy, what were the 
frigates, planes and helicopters doing 'defending' the islands against 
unarmed civilian protestors in fishing craft and rusting buckets? Shore patrol 
craft would have sufficed. 105 
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Although calling for bilateral harmony, the Japanese government appeared determined 
to defend the islands with increasing resolve and resources. 
In July 1996, for the first time Japan's Defence Agency's annual 'White Paper', listed 
China as a regional threat. According to an USIA-Opinion Analysis, 54 per cent of those 
surveyed viewed the Chinese use of force over the islands as a serious threat. After the 
Tai wan missile crisis, 'both Japanese public opinion and the Japanese government took 
a tougher view of China' .106 The increased expenditure by China on its military, in 
particular the modernisation of its air and naval forces, also caused concern amongst 
Japanese scholars. 107 Physical security concerns were real and some LDP members 
called for a more aggressive Senkaku policy, including that the Japanese Self Defence 
Force (SDF) be dispatched to the islands in May 1997 to prepare for a planned landing 
by Taiwanese activists. 108 This revealed some dissension within the Japanese 
government elite but as the Chinese and Japanese governments worked towards a joint 
resolution, internal differences within the Japanese government did not threaten the 
overall outcome. 
Despite the 'rocks of contention' 109 causing political problems for both the Chinese and 
Japanese governn1ents, the Japanese government continued to reiterate the importance 
of bilateral relations 110 as restrained behaviour persisted throughout the height of the 
dispute with high level meetings and exchanges between the two governments 
continuing. 111 Such importance placed on good relations reflected the major 
determinants of foreign policy being not the issue of island sovereignty but the 
preservation of diplomatic ties. The Japanese government insisted that actions by the 
Japanese nationalists would not harm bilateral relations. The Japanese Foreign Minister 
stated in the Yoniiuri that, 'Overall, Japan-China relations would not be affected' .11 2 
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Both countries acknowledged that the issue should not take precedence over shared 
economic prosperity and security. However, the Japanese government appeared to 
counteract this with a need to appease a domestic audience that had shown little interest 
in the dispute. This was despite the government's inactivity regarding Japanese 
nationalists' landing on the islands being criticised by some leading newspapers 
including an editorial in The Japan Times that commented: 
Apparently, both it (the Japanese government) and the Shinshinto 
(Nishimura' s opposition party) leadership preferred to play to domestic 
audiences than act like real statesmen. 113 
This suggests that public opinion in Japan regarding the islands and perhaps also the 
Japanese government's dealings with China, are important domestic political issues. 
Although the Japanese government's basic Senkaku policy was not greatly affected by 
public opinion or the media some shifts in policy were evident. The MSA defence of the 
island intensified in May 1997 as measures were taken to prevent Chinese protestors 
landing on the islands after a member of the Diet's Lower House and of the leading 
opposition party, Shingo Nishimura landed on the islands with a reporter on 7 May and 
again aggravated the issue. An increase in Japanese patrol vessels was also a response to 
the successful Chinese penetration of an MSA cordon in October 1996. In the midst of 
Chinese protestors planning another large scale 'assault' on the islands, the Japanese 
government announced that in the future 'foreign nationals that landed would be 
arrested' .114 An article in The Japan Tinies argued in late May that it was because of this 
'strong stand' taken by the Japanese government that, 'Hong Kong-based Chinese 
stopped visiting the islands ' .115 The visibly stronger stance taken by the government was 
focused on by the Japanese media, which had previously commented more on the 
actions of the Chinese government and protestors. 
Public Sentiment in Japan 
The ability of public sentiment to influence foreign policy is affected by a diversity of 
opinion being expressed by a variety of groups, all with different causes to campaign. 
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These groups vary not only in their opinions but also in their motives, resources and 
ability to have an impact on the political agenda. Domestically, Japanese policy-makers 
are increasingly forced to consider public opinion when making decisions as 
'bureaucrats work through the newspapers to generate appeal for their policies' .116 With 
increasing economic stability in the five decades since the end of World War II, Japan 
has become a nation proud of its social harmony. Since the 1960s and the development 
of greater concern over the 'social and environmental costs of economic 
develop1nent', 117 de1nonstrations have become more prevalent in Japan. The public, 
with an increase in citizens' movements is constantly demanding greater policy 
accountability from its elected officials. 118 Charlton notes an escalation of public 
criticism in Japan, which reflects disillusionment over the government's apparent 
inability to handle challenges including 'economic slowdown, international strategic 
changes, and the problems accompanying fifty years of postwar development' .119 The 
Japanese government's increased aggressiveness towards the Chinese over the 
sovereignty issue may have been as a result of the government's concern with increased 
restlessness and expressions of latent unfavourable opinion towards government 
policies. 
The public does not have 'one sentiment' and instead consists of many groups with 
varying opinions on a variety of issues; whose influence and willingness to demonstrate 
has increased considerably since the 1960s. As mentioned earlier, some groups in Japan 
are also demanding the government act more appropriately as an economic superpower 
and that in order to become a 'key global player' Japan must seek 'first-rate military 
power'. However, just as some groups argue for a more assertive government, so are 
their groups advocating for · the government to maintain the status quo. 120 The 
relationship the media has with the public is influenced by this diversity of opinion, as 
groups ranging from consumer bodies and environmentalists to ultranationalists, use the 
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1nedia for the 'tantalising' opportunities it presents them, such as the ability to transform 
their concerns into the agendas of policy-makers. 121 
Protests in Japan vary in intensity and media support. However, thus far despite 
ultranationalist trips to the islands, there have been few signs of public expression. 
Active lobby groups in Japan are usually concerned with only domestic issues and 
Japanese opinion has been silent and 'disinterested', especially compared to vocal, well 
attended protests in Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
The dispute appears to have provided most of the Japanese public with little impetus for 
overt action apart from the actions of the ultranationalists. Ultrarightist groups have, in 
the past, acted dramatically and grabbed media attention. Such actions have included; a 
car being driven into the gates of the Korean embassy, a politician in Nagoya shot for 
criticising the emperor, a newspaper editor murdered for writing an article critical of the 
royal family and in 1990, the mayor of Nagasaki was shot and wounded by an extremist 
for criticising the late emperor's role in World War II. 122 However, after a brief duration 
in the limelight, these events passed and the nature of these groups still remains 
extremist and regarded as 'embarrassing reminders of Japan's militaristic past and 
frightening evidence of gangland extortionists' .123 
The Senkaku campaign 1n Japan was publicly championed by a fringe movement 
usually associated with 'the mob' .124 The actions of ultranationalists are however, 
looked down on by Japanese society as 'an embarrassment', and an 'ill-mannered 
reminder of an era the nation has long tried to forget' .125 Japanese public sentiment is 
much less visible in the dispute compared to the Chinese, as the majority of the Japanese 
public appear to be indifferent, especially when compared to the volatile Chinese 
protestors. However, the Japanese protestors were reasserting their government's 
existing possession of the islands, as opposed to the Chinese who were campaigning to 
acquire possession. Prominent right wing activities in Japan represent the views of only 
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a fringe element with dubious motives, that are arguably based as much on a need for 
lf bl . . · · + 126 se -pu 1c1ty, as on patnot1c 1ervour. 
In Japan, sentiment 1s not always expressed overtly as influential groups such as 
powerful trade organisations with large investment interests in China, which would be 
financially jeopardised by bilateral conflict, exert more discreet influence on 
government foreign policy. These groups may not receive front-page coverage, but have 
a much greater influence as part of 'Japan Inc' over foreign policy than fringe 
extremists. Japanese Senkaku policy is affected by business interests concentrated in 
Asia, particularly China and the islands in Japan being 'largely unheard of'. 
Japanese public senti1nent regarding the islands is varied as opinions differ on what is 
perceived to be a desirable outcome to the dispute. Japanese fishermen, like Taiwanese 
fishennen are concerned about their rights and the greatest possible area in which to 
legally be able to fish in. Other groups taking a pragmatic viewpoint see economic 
prosperity as a major priority along with regional harmony and are keen to negotiate an 
agree1nent in order for both sides to benefit. Still other groups such as nationalists or 
sympathetic Diet members may wish for a confrontation and seek to provoke China. The 
intentions of these groups are important, as it can reveal the extent to which they will go 
in order to have their opinions heard. 
Is this territorial dispute able to inflame passions and patriotic fervour in Japan enough 
to de1nand an assertive response from the government and influence Senkaku policy? 
This is an issue concerning sovereignty and nationalism against old enemy China. Are 
these not ingredients to stir · nationalism and incite a military response from the 
government should the Chinese government start to lay stronger claims? What makes 
some groups expression of sentiment more vocal and dominant than others? It would 
appear that although the ultranationalists receive the publicity, the majority is willing to 
take a pragmatic approach towards the islands. 
126 Ibid., p.30. 
36 
Media-Sentiment-Policy Relationship in Japan 
In Japan, the media-sentiment-policy relationship is affected by a number of external 
factors. As 1nentioned in Chapter One their is difficulty in isolating one influence from 
another and the specific impact on policy of each group. The Japanese media act as a 
watchdog and the unofficial 'opposition party'; the public are highly literate and avid 
newspaper readers; 127 and the government is the instrument behind the Japanese 
economic 1niracle. Within each group exists a number of factions with differing 
opinions, motives and varying levels of influence. 
The relationship between policy and the media can be divided as stated in Chapter One, 
into domestic and foreign policy. In Japan, domestic policy issues are more relevant to 
the public and consequently, sometimes affected by local movements and campaigns. In 
some instances, newspaper content can be influenced by such activity due to a need to 
sell to the audience and not restrict their market potential. Large national newspapers in 
Japan invite audience loss by going against majority opinion and there is 'little 
enthusiasm' for support of minority views that are 'out of step' with popular thought 
and without the support of a large organisation. 128 Hence, the Japanese media pays little 
attention to protests and individual complaints and although protest groups in Japan 
receive publicity, it is usually condemned and 'marginalised' .129 
The Japanese public's disinterest in foreign issues is reinforced by its famed 
'international apathy': Japan 's UN Ambassador (until 1994), Yoshio Hatano said, 'The 
Japanese ... want to stay out of the world's wars. So safe is Japan that its people cannot 
stand the thought of danger' .130 This lack of enthusiasm to get involved in international 
activity has been contributed to by constitutional restriction (section nine), which 
inhibits Japanese forces going abroad. This has been enhanced through the mass media, 
who appear to 'disseminate a friendly face' but are actually manipulating the public and 
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creating a 'political apathy' .131 This apathy in Japan is not just towards international 
issues, but also often domestic ones. However, this manipulation by the government is 
often necessary as explained in Chapter One. In Japan, a pacifist public little aware or 
interested in Japanese foreign policy, allows the government more room to deal 
effectively with bilateral relations and formulate policy. 
The foreign policy-media relationship in Japan can also be affected by the ideology of 
the ruling party. Nishimura ' s landing was in keeping with a 'ca1npaign pledge' made 
before the general elections in October 1996. 132 Nishimura, in a subtle attack on the 
Chinese government, justified his actions by claiming he was free to land on the islands 
and declared that 'the Japanese government allows its citizens to travel freely with their 
de1nocratic right to do so' and that it was 'natural' for a Diet member to ' inspect part of 
Japanese territory'. 133 Although the Japanese government is democratic and has 
acknowledged the right of citizens to travel freely, it 'quickly expressed displeasure over 
his actions'. 134 Japanese Senkaku policy and related actions may have been based on 
both a need to appease domestically and a desire to gain increased support from within 
the constituency. 
Regarding political issues, the Japanese media has displayed a tendency to downplay 
events. Japan is regarded as a politically apathetic environment, especially regarding 
foreign affairs, and news that would 'cause an uproar' in other industrialised 
--
democracies often only results in a 'faint murmur' in Japan. 135 Mc Veigh describes the 
1992 incident in the Sea of Japan where North Korea carried out missile tests, and 
clai1ned that compared to international coverage, local reporting was minimal. In 
contrast, in the Japanese summer of 1994, the Japanese media audience became 
obsessed with a month-long coverage and investigation into a duck that had been shot in 
the head with an arrow. 136 The Japanese media audience is not encouraged by the ruling 
elite to be involved in foreign affairs. This is because of the government' s aim to 
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achieve greater efficiency with some degree of 'secrecy' in the areas of defence and 
f · ff · 137 ore1gn a airs. 
Newspaper Analysis in Japan after the Lighthouse Incident 
From the three newspapers examined, a total of 182 articles were collected in the two-
year period fron1 1996-1998. In 1996, the analysis starts from the date of the lighthouse 
construction on July 14th and continues through to the end of October, the last month of 
activity that year. The analysis also covers May 1997 when a Diet member landed 
together with a journalist on the islands and June/July 1998, when a flotilla of Chinese 
protest vessels tried to land on the islands. The latest incident took place in late June 
1998, when a Taiwanese fishing boat was damaged and, according to Chinese sources, 
sunk by an intervening Japanese MSA vessel. However, the actual sinking is disputed 
by both Japanese and western media sources which claimed that the boat was merely 
dainaged. 138 They also claim that the boat had been deliberately tampered with to ensure 
a sinking and hence create an awkward situation for the Japanese government. 
Coverage of the dispute in Japan was minimal until Chinese protests escalated in August 
1996 and were used as a media focal point. Although the Chinese had been protesting in 
not only Asia but also North America since 1972, the islands were largely unknown to 
the Japanese people. As The Far Eastern Economic Review observed: 
When Eto' s group built the Diaoyu lighthouse, Japanese newspapers largely 
ignored the incident. Only when strong protests erupted in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan did it become a story. Until then, most Japanese hadn't even heard 
of the islands.139 
It is difficult to assess the true implications of this lack of awareness due to a variety of 
other potential influences, however possibilities include a typical low key Japanese 
approach to a potentially inflarnmatory foreign relations issue, or a lack of exciting news 
potential. Despite this, Japanese newspapers eventually published reports with coverage 
in the Mainichi almost daily in September and October 1996 with 51 articles for the two 
months (including evening editions). Although some criticism was aimed at the 
Japanese government, there was general affirmation of Tokyo ' s claims, and although 
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editorials called for a 'calm response to the dispute', they also generally 'supported 
Tokyo's claims to the Senkakus'. 140 
Y omiuri Shimbun 
The Yomiuri Shinibun 1s Japan's largest newspaper with a 'conservative voice,' 
'autocratic management' and a reputation for 'hard-nosed sales tactics' with 'substantial 
sway' over Japanese public opinion. 141 The Yomiuri in 1996, had from July until the end 
of October, published 31 articles on the dispute. This was about the same as The Japan 
Tinies, but only half the number published by direct rival the Mainichi. This included 
front-page articles in 1996 on 7 August, 25 September, 27 September, 7 October (in 
both the daily and evening edition) and 13 October. In 1997, the issue resurfaced on the 
front-page in May when Nishi1nura landed on the islands. The emphasis in most articles 
was mainly on Hong Kong and Taiwanese protests and the active involvement of their 
1. · · 142 po 1t1c1ans. 
The reporting was quite neutral, providing information on the incidents with no editorial 
comment or opinion, but merely reports on what occurred and what was said, with most 
e1nphasis on the Chinese protests. This reporting style was in direct contrast to China's 
main newspaper, the Renminribao, which argued not only the Chinese case, but also 
strongly condemned the actions of the Japanese, referring constantly to militaristic Japan 
with continual references to the war. Other points of attack against the Japanese 
government in the Chinese press included; Hashimoto's Yasukuni Shrine visit in July 
1996, the Nanjing Massacre of 1937 and the Japanese textbook controversy which has 
haunted the Japanese government since the issue surfaced in the early 1980s. 
In May 1997, the 'pro-government' Yomiuri published only seven articles and in 
June/July 1998 only two. After a volatile 1996, coverage in the Yomiuri decreased 
considerably especially compared to The Japan Times and the Mainichi. Perhaps this 
reflected the Japanese government trying to downplay the dispute. The Japanese Foreign 
Minister condemned the actions of Nishimura in early May 1997 and stated in the 
Y oniiuri that: 
139 S. Moffett. 'The right and its wrongs'. The Far Eastern Economic Review. November 21, 1996, p.29. 
140 The Japan Times . 'Japan must defuse the islands powder keg '. October 20, 1996, p.20. 
141 J. Friedland. 'Hard news'. Far Eastern Economic Review. March 10, 1994, p.44 
142 Yomiuri Shimbun. 'Tsugekikougisenokeikaku'. September 27, 1996, p.5. 
The Japanese islands are still a part of Japanese territory, however, we 
cannot let this damage friendly relations with China. 143 
40 
This statement and condemnation of Nishimura indicated a slight shift from the 
Senkaku policy of the Japanese government in 1996, which ignored the activities of 
Japanese nationalists. This attitude combined with an increase in island defence and the 
Japanese government vowing to prevent further Japanese nationalist activity, reflecting 
also a response to both the internal and domestic audiences. 
Mainichi Shimbun 
The Mainichi Shimbun is one of Japan's leading liberal dailies. From July until the end 
of October 1996, it published a total of 62 articles, 31 more than the Yomiuri and 30 
more than The Japan Times. This included front-page articles on 25 September 
( evening edition), 26 September, daily and evening editions, (the former having a 
provocative photo of Chinese protestors in a speed boat with a Chinese flag flying), 27 
September and 7 October, evening edition, the latter with a large photo of the Chinese 
and Taiwanese flags planted on one of the islands by Chinese protestors. Most articles 
were neutral in the reporting of incidents and without the emotive style of the Chinese 
and Hong Kong newspapers. 
The drowning of the Hong Kong activist in September 1996, received slightly more 
attention than in the Yoniiuri , with a small headline regarding the death. However, the 
larger headlines focused on the prolonging of the dispute and questioned Chinese 
motives for protesting and the effect of upcoming Hong Kong elections on the 
enthusiasm of certain Hong Kong activists. 144 The Mainichi provided numerous reports 
on the volatile activity of the Chinese protestors and was slightly aggressive towards the 
inactivity of the Japanese government and declared that the Japanese government should 
have, 'acted sensibly much earlier' .145 
The argument made by the Jvl ainichi was supported in the political affairs magazine 
Sekai, which commented on the Japanese government's failure to take preventative 
143 Yomiuri Shimbun(evening edition). 'Senkakugyotodonijoriku'. May 6, 1997, p.l. 
144 Mainichi Shimb un. 'Nagabikukasenkakumondai'. September 27, 1996, p.3. 
145 M. Forney, S. Moffett and G. Silverman. 'Ghosts of the past'. Far Eastern Economic Review. October 
10, 1996, p.24. 
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action against the ultranationalists. 146 The conservative Yomiuri did not comment on the 
government's actions or inaction. The Mainichi, although not as open as The Japan 
Tinies, still suggested that the Japanese government needed to act more decisively to 
avoid escalation of the situation. 
Critical comments in the Mainichi towards the Japanese government's Senkaku policy, 
were accompanied with a questioning of the motives and actions of the Chinese 
protestors and the Hong Kong media. One article in the Mainichi147 quoted a Hong 
Kong radio journalist who claimed that the 'hysteria' caused by the protests and 
subsequent death of a protestor, was the partial responsibility of the Hong Kong media. 
The commentator also quoted an amount spent thus far on the protest that could have 
instead been spent on 'building a children's hospital'. The journalist also asked if it was 
not for the stress and anxiety caused by the looming Hong Kong Handover, would the 
Hong Kong protests be this hysterical? As a more liberal newspaper, the Mainichi 
offered opinion in contrast to the conservative Yomiuri which made no speculation as to 
the nature of Chinese protests. In May 1997, it published 19 articles and six in June/July 
1998. Although without the diversity of argument and debate in The Japan Times, the 
Mainchi provided the domestic audience with regular information and subtle editorial 
comn1ent and as a liberal alternative to the pro-government Y omiuri. 
The Japan Times 
Japan's leading English language newspaper, despite the 'Lighthouse Incident' 
occurring on July 14t\ reported nothing until July 22°d. This article focused not on the 
lighthouse construction but on Taiwanese protests, 148 with the construction of the 
lighthouse not even mentioned· until paragraph seven, halfway through the article. The 
article focused on Taiwanese fishing groups planning to sail to the islands to protest and 
provided background information on the dispute, with only one small paragraph on 
Japan's sovereignty claim. Four days before this article appeared, The Japan Times, 
published an article entitled 'Ultrarights become more marginalized,' which discussed 
ultraright groups, their dwindling numbers, gangster connections and claimed that 
146 M. Kojima. 'Nichutairitsuosawanishitasenkakushotomondai'. Sekai. November 1996, p.257. 
147 Mainichi Shimbun. 'Seinihenkangoenofuan'. October 15, 1996, p.4. 
148 The Japan Times. 'Taiwanese fishermen to protest Senkaku claims'. July 22, 1996, p.2 
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ultranationalist groups were more about needing a political front 1n order to make 
money than about fanaticism and ideology. 149 
The total number of articles in The Japan Times was considerably fewer than in the 
vernacular press. From July until the end of October 1996, The Japan Tinies published a 
total of 32 articles (including letters to the editor) about the dispute, with the majority 
appearing in October. In May 1997 there were 21 articles and only two in June/July 
1998. Most of the articles focused not on the actions of the Japanese nationalists or 
state1nents by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, but on Chinese protests in Taiwan and 
Hong Kong. 150 The Chinese government statements published reflected aggression 
towards Japanese sovereignty claims. However, they also, as did the Japanese 
government, continued to emphasise that friendly bilateral relations between China and 
Japan were important and that relations would not be damaged by the issue. The paper 
provided a wide range of opinion on the dispute. 
In the case of the disputes most dramatic incident, the drowning of a protestor from 
Hong Kong this warranted only one headline which appeared in The Japan Times on the 
27 September (Activist dies in Senkaku standoffJ. However, this was not followed up 
with another report the next day. Two days later the paper published a letter to the editor 
by a Chinese-American arguing Chinese sovereignty. 151 The next day, 30 September, a 
small article appeared in 'National News Briefs' on page two, about Taiwanese and 
Hong Kong activists planning to visit the islands. Nothing was reported again for seven 
days, until a Chinese combined flotilla penetrated the Japanese MSA cordon on 7 
October, to plant flags on the islands, which were quickly removed by the MSA. In May 
1997, the newspaper published 21 articles with opinions that both condemned and 
supported the actions of diet member, Shingo Nishimura. 
Japanese media op1n1on on the dispute included an editorial in May 1997 strongly 
condemning Nishimura's actions and the Japanese government's failure to act decisively 
and instead preferring to take 'refuge in hand-wringing' while a crisis brewed. 152 The 
newspaper also included letters to the editor both for and against Japanese sovereignty, 
149 The Japan Times. 'Ultra-rights become more marginalized '. July 18, 1996, p.3. 
150 The Japan Times . 'Beijing lodges protest over Senkaku rightist group'. September 12, 1996, p.2. 
151 The Japan Times. 'The islands are Chinese'. September 29, 1996, p.18. 
152 The Japan Times. Footprints on the Senkakus. May 8, 1997, p.18. 
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an editorial comment from the Singaporean newspaper, The Strait Times ( 14 May 
1997), reminding the Japanese government to 'keep trouble makers in check', and 
opinions from foreign analysts and Japanese academics arguing both for and against a 
more assertive Japanese foreign policy. The paper provided an open forum for debate 
and opinion especially compared to the rhetoric put forth by its counterpart in China, 
The China Daily. It also provided much wider discussion of dispute related events and 
issues than the vernacular press (for these reasons it has been more widely referenced in 
this chapter than the vernacular press). Readers of this newspaper had the opportunity to 
gain a more balanced know ledge of the dispute than from any of the other newspapers 
discussed. 
Effect on Senkaku Policy 
In the dispute there were many factors capable of influencing Japanese foreign policy. 
However, it see1ns that the 1nost influential were the pragmatists with a focus on 
continued good relations with China and economic prosperity. Prime Minister 
Hashimoto eventually cancelled his second visit to the Y asukuni Shrine in October 1996 
at the height of the tensions, possibly as a result of both domestic and international 
pressure. The Japanese government was aware of the anti-Japanese sentiment already 
existing in the Chinese territories as Chinese newspapers carried a steady stream of 
articles criticising Japan for wartime atrocities and for 'failing' to ackn0-wledge their 
1nilitant past. As the Japanese government was quoted in the Mainichi: 
Setting a spark to the grass roots of the Chinese people's anti-Japanese 
sentiment would cause serious problems. 153 
In Japan there was intense media coverage in September and October of 1996. Media 
coverage included reports of strong anti-I apanese protests that involved flag burning, a 
forceful consulate 'sit--in protest', 154 eggs being thrown, a call to boycott Japanese goods 
in both Hong Kong and Taiwan, 155 and a protest demonstration at a Japanese school in 
Hong Kong. The Hong Kong protest group claimed that the Japanese were responsible 
for the 'invasion of China' and that for the 'sake of future peace, proper historical 
153 Mainichi Shimbun. 'Dakaisakurnirarenunihon'. September 19, 1996, p.9. 
154 Mainichi Shimbun. 'Nihonryojikandesuwarikornikougi'. October 10, 1996, p.7. 
155 Mainichi Shimbun. 'Senkakumondaidenihonseishohinfubaiyobikake ' . September 17 , 1996, p.3 . 
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education in Japan was vital'. 156 Despite this, there appeared to be little response from 
the Japanese public and excluding extremist activity, few expressions of opinion on 
Japanese Senkaku policy. 
Reports in Japanese newspapers focused on the actions of Chinese protestors. In early 
October 1996, after four months of volatile activity, Chinese protestors landed on the 
islands successfully for the first time. The protestors planted Chinese and Taiwanese 
flags which were quickly removed by the MSA. After this incident, the Japanese 
government then issued a warning that future 'illegal trespassers' would be arrested and 
held. 157 This indicated a slight policy shift on behalf of the Japanese government, which 
was reinforced in May 1997 when the next large scale Chinese attempt to land on the 
islands took place and the MSA, determined not to see a repeat of the October 1996 
confrontation, ensured that the island were successfully defended. This included the 
temporary detainment of three Taiwanese protestors, for 'illegally entering Japanese 
territory' without proper documentation. 158 This represented a definite shift in Japanese 
Senkaku policy as the government become more assertive in its efforts to defend the 
islands. 
Japanese newspapers reported provocative events with much greater impartiality than 
the Chinese media. This reporting was without the emotive and nationalistic rhetoric of 
the Chinese and Hong Kong press. 159 The Mainichi as a more liberal publication, 
provided greater coverage than its more conservative rival, the Yomiuri. The focus was 
not on the actions of nationalists or even Foreign Ministry comment, but on the response 
of the Chinese and their protests. However, just as the flag raising and flotilla 
expeditions subsided, so did media coverage. 
The Japanese government's Senkaku policy was portrayed objectively in the newspapers 
as 'firm'. Actions taken by groups were reported as such, and comments and statements 
made by activists and government officials were reported as being 'said' and 'claimed' 
in contrast to the Chinese media which reported as a collective stance taken on behalf of 
the Chinese government and the entire nation. The Chinese press in contrast, lacked any 
156 Mainichi Shimbun. 'Jinminnipogaronbun' . September 19, 1996, p.14. 
157 Yomiuri Shimbun ( evening edition). 'Fuhojoriku, konggodahomo ' . October 7 , 1996, p.2. 
158 Mainichi Shimbun. 'Ichijifutarikosoku'. May 27, 1997, p. l. 
159 S. Tomisaka .. 'Senkakushotodaregahannichinoshuhoushaka'. Bungeishunju. December 1996, p .368. 
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real impartiality, which will be discussed in Chapter Three. Although the Japanese 
newspapers showed indifference and maintained 'facts', as mentioned in Chapter One, 
apparent partiality shown by the press does not negate underlying messages as the press 
is aware that the reader has some background knowledge, and is familiar with the 
reporting style, intention and position of the newspaper. Both vernacular newspapers 
referred to the waters around the islands as Japanese 'territorial waters' and the Chinese 
government and protestors were described as being 'strident and inflammatory' 160 while 
Japanese actions were depicted as justified acts of self-defence. The Japanese vernacular 
press although subtle in its expression of opinion, were mostly pro-government on the 
issue of territorial ownership. 
All three newspapers gave the dispute front-page coverage at some stage. However, it 
was only The Japan Tilnes, a newspaper with a predominantly expatriate audience, that 
gave the dispute a banner headline. The motto of The Japan Tinies declares 'without 
fear or favour' and editorial pursuits appear to be striving for this with its diversity of 
comment, publishing a letter to the editor of The Japan Tinies arguing the Chinese 
government's case written by a Chinese-American shows a greater openness to the 
dispute than on the Chinese side. In China, the English language equivalent, The China 
Daily, contained no such argument presenting the Japanese side. In the Chinese press, 
letters to the editor were aggressive, condemning the Japanese for not only the Senkaku 
dispute but also numerous other acts of aggression Japan has inflicted on China since 
--
the late 19th century. 161 The only Japanese argument that appeared in the Chinese press 
was excerpts from a 25-year-old paper by a Japanese historian, Kiyoshi Inoue, arguing 
that the islands belonged to China not J apan. 162 
The process of policy formation 1s carefully insulated in Japan. The government's 
influence on the media and subsequently the public, is enhanced by the Kisha Club 
system which allows the Japanese government much control over the dissemination of 
information. It can also be said that the possible influence of lobby groups in society is 
usually minimal, particularly regarding foreign affairs due to the Japanese government 
160 I.Wilkinson . 'Hypocrisy over the Senkaku Islands'. The New Observer (internet). 
161 The China Daily. August 22, 1996, p.6. 
162 The China Daily . May 9, 1997, p.8. 
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restricting when possible public access to information and a generally apathetic 
Japanese public. 
Regarding differences between the vernacular press, for the domestic audience the 
Yoniiuri and Mainichi make continual references to the Chinese entering Japanese 
territorial waters. The Mainichi, and the more conservative Yomiuri, constantly refer to 
the islands as being in Japan's 'territorial waters and being 'violated' by Chinese 
protestors. This is in contrast to the expatriate-oriented The Japan Tinies which says that 
the protestors entered waters 'claimed' by the Japanese. These differences highlight the 
different audiences being catered to by the Japanese press, hence revealing some 
importance attached to catering to reader tastes and public opinion. 
After the death of the Hong Kong activist and an escalation of the problem in late 
September 1996, the Japanese police raided the home of a member of the ultrarightist 
group responsible for the building of the controversial lighthouse that had according to 
the Mainichi, 'escalated anti-Japanese protests in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan' .163 
The 1nember was arrested for the illegal possession of a weapon. One can only speculate 
to the connection of this arrest to bilateral problems, as at the time, the Japanese 
government was facing pressure from the Chinese government to deal with ultrarightists 
and even some criticism from local Japanese newspapers for failing to oppose Japanese 
activists. 
The Japanese government's failure to restrain Japanese ultrarightists landing on the 
islands was perhaps influenced by domestic factors. An article in The Japan Times from 
a Singaporean newspaper co~ented: 
It is not difficult to see why landing on the Diaoyu Islands, claimed by 
China, Taiwan and Japan, should be a ritual much favored by Japanese 
politicians with an eye on the nationalist vote. The Senkakus, as they are 
known in Japanese, are a convenient and inexpensive way of using 
patriotism to promote political popularity .164 
Although the Japanese government initially acknowledged an 'unwavering' position on 
sovereignty, there were signs of policy adjustment. What was the significance of this 
arrest reported in the Renniinribao that also led to a police search of the group's head 
163 Mainichi Shimbun. 'Senkakunitodaisechikeshakanbuotaihou'. October 3, 1996, p.14 . 
164 The Japan Times. 'The Senkakus are not for landing'. May 14, 1997, p.18. 
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office in Tokyo? 165 Perhaps this timely raid enabled the Japanese government to 'save 
face' by although not completing 'giving in' to Chinese govern1nent pressure, was still 
able to publicly threaten ultrarightists and subsequently send a message to Chinese 
critics that at least some action was being taken. Eventually in September 1997 talks 
co1nmenced and foundations laid for future joint exploration of the area. 
Conclusion 
Japan's Senkaku policy was not greatly affected by the media or the public in Japan. 
However, there was some minor adjustment made. These shifts are impossible to 
attribute to one particular factor such as the impact of the press and domestic sentiment, 
which must have interacted with the government's economic imperative and a need 
social stability. The Japanese government clearly acted more aggressively in its 
willingness to defend the islands and repel Chinese protestors. Such shifts included the 
May 1997 decision to .arrest foreign nationals landing on the islands, the decision to 
provide greater MSA support in the region, to settle a fishing agreement with the 
Taiwanese and finally to move towards a joint control zone with China in 1997. Forces 
behind the scenes such as economic consideration have also been working towards 
certain outcomes such as the need for the bilateral preservation of good relations as 
1nentioned in the Japanese press. 
During the two years 1996-1998, other events caused greater controversy than the 
dispute. The US defence treaty created tension and the Y asukuni Shrine visit more than 
anything caused intense protest which resulted in cancelling the second planned visit in 
October 1996. The process of influencing foreign policy, as discussed in Chapter One 
reveals that the Senkaku dispute was not important enough to warrant intense coverage 
that could lead to any major influence on foreign policy, particularly as Japan had 
control of the islands. However, a combination of events aroused even more the 
constant anti-Japanese sentiment in the Chinese territories, and Japan had to react to this 
sentiment. The actions of ultranationalist groups have been written off by the Japanese 
public and government as excessive and not as a result of mounting nationalist 
165 The Japan Times. 'Police raid rightists over illegal gun'. October 4, 1996, p.2. 
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sentiment in Japan as the Chinese claim. The Japanese government appears to be able to 
manipulate the media enough to downplay the events and maintain current policy. 
The Senkaku dispute although a potential crisis situation for policymakers within the 
Japanese govern1nent, was not enough to greatly affect basic foreign policy. Although 
the Japanese government stood firm on its sovereignty claims, it acknowledged the need 
for bilateral stability and looked towards joint exploration with China. In order for the 
situation to escalate and policy to change dramatically, it would have taken extreme 
action from one side, which would have then jeopardised the prosperity of both. It was a 
combination of influences including the Y asukuni Shrine visit, nationalistic Japanese 
politicians and longstanding tension between the Japanese and Chinese governments 
that forced the Japanese government to carefully balance international diplomacy with a 
domestic show of resolve. 
Traditional foreign policy determinants in Japan such as econoffilc security and 
prosperity were not affected by the actions of 'heated' minority groups. On the contrary, 
they were being reinforced. Both governments were eager to seek peaceful resolution. 
Analysis of the Japanese press through the Senkaku dispute has suggested that in most 
cases in a liberal democratic society such as Japan, including a situation that involves a 
territorial dispute and nationalistic sentiment, basic government foreign policy is not 
affected significantly by the media or public opinion. Although policy shifts may occur 
as they did here, these can be attributed to a number of factors including the 
govern1nent' s need to contain an issue, ensure economic stability and preserve bilateral 
hannony or to public sentiment and media coverage in China, rather than Japan itself. 
3 
Public Sentiment, The Media and Decision-Making on the 
Senkaku Dispute in China 
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The dispute over the Senkaku Islands has raised a number of serious issues for China. 
The Chinese government warned that anyone who 'dares' to take their territory will be 
'cursed for centuries' .166 There are few contests more inflammatory to the Chinese than 
a territorial claim. The dispute, according to the Renniinribao, is an example of a 
'militaristic' Japan 'again violating China's territory' .167 This has created increased 
nationalistic rhetoric in China and tension between the two countries. The Chinese 
government must balance patriotic fervour with its reliance on Japan for investment and 
trade if it is to maintain economic progress. This struggle is combined with external 
pressure from arch rival Taiwan and Hong Kong, which are both challenging the 
Chinese govern1nent to act on the territorial dispute by claiming that, 'if China is 
thinking about national pride and sovereignty, there is no reason to be weak over the 
Diaoyus'. 168 This has placed the Chinese government in a compromising situation. How 
has sentiment both internal and external affected Beijing's policy stance? 
This chapter examines the influence of public sentiment and the media over China's 
foreign policy with respect to the Senkaku dispute. The influence of public sentiment 
and the media in a country with China's political system is quite different in important 
ways from the influence they have on foreign policy in liberal democratic political 
systems such as Japan. In China' s authoritarian system, the state seeks to exercise tight 
control over most aspects of a socialist society. In the previous chapter, the unique 
relationship between the Japanese media and the government was discussed, this chapter 
provides a contrast to the Japanese situation as the Chinese political character and press 
structure differs greatly from Japan. The nature and formation of Chinese policy is 
discussed along with the factors that may influence foreign policy. How do external and 
internal factors affect foreign policy formation in a closed regime? 
166 Renminribao. 'Ribenbieganchunshi'. August 30, 1996, p.1. 
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This chapter analyses the coverage of the Senkaku dispute in three mainstream Chinese 
newspapers, two vernaculars and the leading English language paper, from July 1996 to 
June 1998, focusing on the most volatile months of protest activity and bilateral tension. 
Coverage commences with the 'Lighthouse Incident' in July 1996, which as mentioned 
earlier, created a 'lightning rod effect' by causing a new wave of anti-Japanese 
sentiment in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. This chapter also includes a special section 
addressing the Hong Kong factor, examining the unique role played by Hong Kong as a 
democratic window into freely expressed Chinese sentiment able to be voiced louder 
than on the Mainland with the potential to have affect Chinese foreign policy. 
The Political Order in China 
China represents one of the last bastions of a decaying order based on authoritarian 
government control. This control extends over the media, with policies previously based 
on an ideology declared to be the 'will' of the masses that supposedly reflected public 
sentiment. Socialism is dying and China has been 'left ideologically bereft by the global 
collapse of communism' .169 The challenge now facing the regime is one of maintaining 
legitimacy, as China has progressively abandoned its traditional socialist ideology in 
favour of a set of ideas that gives primacy to market forces and private ownership. The 
government has been forced to pay close attention to managing public perceptions of 
what legitimates the Communist Party's hold on power. In turning to capitalism, the 
government has been able to rely on economic growth and personal enrichment of its 
population to maintain the legitimacy. In making this transition, the government has also 
been forced to play up feelings of patriotism because many in China have had to make 
substantial personal sacrifices. With the abandonment of socialism, many welfare 
benefit such as free universal education, free universal medical care and a livable 
pen ion for life have begun to disappear. With market oriented economic reforms, the 
ruling party's claim that 'China is a socialist country' are being 'increasingly 
undercut'. 170 At the same time, for the government to keep political support for 
169 N.Chanda and K.Huus. 'The new nationalism' . Far Eastern Economic Review. November 9, 1995, 
p.20. 
170 E.S. Downs and P .C. Saunders. 'Legitimacy and the limits of nationalism: China and the Diaoyu 
Islands '. International Securit) . Winter 1998, vol.23, no .3, p.117. 
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politically costly economic reforms, it cannot afford to be seen to be soft on issues such 
as sovereignty and territorial disputes. 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) assumed rule after defeating the Nationalists in 
1949 and achieved 'political unity in China for the first time in over a century' .17 1 The 
CCP' s history has been marked by sudden shifts in what the acceptance of the 'party 
line' should be, and each shift has led to massive and brutal campaigns to enforce 
discipline behind the lines and eradicate opposing views. These campaigns of 
purification and eradication have caused constant unrest both amongst the ranks and 
within society and exposed any expression of sentiment that deviated from CCP policy 
to be vulnerable to incarceration, labour camps or death. Consequently, expression of 
opinion and dissent by any means including through the media is uncommon, as the 
Chinese public remembers the brutality shown to those expressing any form of 
opposition to the government. 
Under the Chinese system, the population have had very little opportunity to be heard on 
issues of government policy. Although the economy is characterised by increasing 
capitalist tendencies and an open market, public impact on policy formation is greatly 
restricted by the government. However, the influence of democratic societies is giving 
the Chinese public previously unheard of scope for expression of behaviour both in and 
outside of the market place. Civil unrest and the expression of mass sentiment is now 
more based on economic uncertainty and social instability than the calls for democracy 
of a decade ago. 
It was not until the death of Mao in 197 6 that China began to work towards stabilising 
the chaos created by the Cultural Revolution and emerge from self imposed isolation. In 
1978, Deng Xiaoping introduced a number of reformist policies that allowed the 
introduction of some market competition and focused on strengthening Chinese 
industries and a move away from isolationist policy. Although policy is still removed 
from both independent media influence and popular opinion, foreign relations with both 
developed Western countr:es and the rapidly developing nations of Asia, are 
171 R.Taylor. Greater China and Japan: prospects for an economic partnership in East Asia. Routledge, 
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increasingly 'directed by economic imperative' .172 Chinese policy in the late 1990s is 
market oriented and focused on the development of Chinese power both economically 
and militarily. The ruling party increasingly has to justify diminished socialism with 
economic performance. As Taylor notes, the 'economic open door policy' of Deng 
Xiaoping and his successors has staked the CCP' s political legitimacy not on 'Marxism-
Leninism' but on its own capacity to 'improve the living standards' of the Chinese 
people as successful economic development equals political stability, and achieving this 
stability at home and abroad, particularly in Asia, is crucial. 173 
Foreign policy in China is influenced by both internal and external factors such as 
economic security, prosperity, physical security, socialist ideology and even in a more 
indirect sense, by public sentiment. Until the death of Mao, the CCP based its right to 
rule on socialist ideology and nationalist tendencies in order to both 'mobilize support 
for threatened elites and to fend off potential challengers' .174 The Communist's original 
claim to legitimacy was partly based upon its resistance to Japan and even now Japan 
continues to 'provide a useful target that allows Chinese leaders to define China's 
national identity in opposition to Japanese aggression and imperialism' .175 However, 
this now complicates bilateral interaction as the CCP must justify to 'the people' 
increased interaction with Japan in not only trade but also cultural and political circles 
against widespread Chinese government inspired anti-Japanese rhetoric. 
The changing political order has also affected public sentiment and although China 
continues to violate human rights and deal harshly with dissidents, 'it doesn't appear to 
be retreating from reform'. 176 The Chinese government see human rights in terms of 
'national prosperity rather than individual well-being' .177 Hence, the government's need 
to quash unfavourable expressions of sentiment and opinion is justified by the party as 
being 'for the greater good'. Despite the government's desire to avoid public 
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confrontation, there have been major changes in China recently regarding freedom of 
speech and expression of sentiment, which will be discussed later. 
Despite Chinese government efforts to control the media and the public, external factors 
continue to affect the 'untouchability' of Chinese foreign policy. These factors include 
China's emerging superpower status which is creating hegemonic concerns expressed by 
Asian neighbours fearing growing Chinese assertiveness on territorial claims. 178 With 
this new status, the CCP must placate the domestic audience affected by reform as it 
struggles with economic uncertainty, the collapse and closure of many state-owned 
enterprises and an end to the 'iron rice-bowl' era, 179 whe~·e coffilnunism ensured food for 
work. 
Despite widespread changes, the media as declared by Chinese president Jiang Zemin, 
must remain 'finnly in the hands of our party' .180 Although it is difficult to examine the 
effect of the media on policy in China as policy-makers often control media content, 
increased decentralisation of the media is creating a more liberal environment and a 
di versification of the media. 181 Influential factors affecting policy in China include an 
uncertain society, which has emerged from persistent poverty, technological 
backwardness, pervasive economic inefficiency 182 and isolation, to a society that has 
becon~e , one of the worlds largest and fastest growing economies, that despite thus far 
successful attc~ npts at liberalisation, is plagued with .' economic uncertainty and popular 
dissatisfaction with official corruption'. 183 
The Chinese . public now has greater access to information and more opportunity to 
express opinion than ever before. This increased level of awareness of events continues 
to hinder Chinese government efforts to manipulate tht dissemination of information 
and to control sentirµent. The challenge to the regime is to 1naintain this course of 
openness and i1nprove the regime's image as the country with 'the worst public relations 
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sense of any maJor government 1n the world' .184 This js to be done whilst 
simultaneously portraying to domestic audiences a nationalistic approach to the 
traditional ideological rival, the West, and to the Japanese. It is a common charge in 
Chinese 1nedia that the Japanese government have 'distorted the country's history, 
glorified its war of aggression and imbued its countrymen with a sense of militarism'. 185 
Downs and Saunders note that contradictions exist between 'domestic appeals to 
nationalis1n and economic performance' as the government seeks to 'manipulate foreign 
and domestic perceptions' , so that legitimacy based on economic performance and 
nationalism do not become 'unmanageable' .186 
The Media in Chinese Society 
The Chinese media play a key role in the dissemination of communist party propaganda. 
After 1949, the press tightly controlled by the ruling party, continued to publish stories 
of communist heroes and anti-imperialist rhetoric, denounced enemies of the state and 
restricted information available to the public. In the mid-1950s a brief period of liberal 
thinking and expression was followed by the first of Mao's many brutal crackdowns on 
critics of the regime. This had an impact not only on the Chinese people's willingness to 
express opinion adverse to the regime, but also on the nature of the Chinese press. 
During the Cultural Revolution ( 1966-197 6), the media forum was a playground for 
rival factions and manipulated by those in power to incriminate and destroy enemies. 
After the death of Mao, the four modernisations were initiated (industry, agriculture, 
science and technology and defence) and the media began to stabilise in the Party' s 
hands after a decade of uncertainty. Attempts to gradually liberalise the press in the 
early 1980s were dealt harshly with during the 'anti-spiritual pollution ' campaign 
launched in 1983, as directives from the central government in Beijing continued to 
do1ninate the Chinese media and the media was watched carefully as a government 
controlled group acted as the 'final arbiter on the line that media units must toe ' . 187 
184 P . Gries. A 'China threat' Power and passion in Chinese 'Face Nationalism' . World Affairs 1999 
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Attempts by the media to liberalise were halted again by the CCP after the Tiananmen 
massacre in 1989, when once again press controls were tightened and Xinhua limited 
not only content but also the publication registration system. Publications were 
co1npelled to register with the government and publishing licences were issued at the 
strict discretion of the Party. One condition of receiving a licence was that all papers had 
to have a supervisory departlnent attached to the superior government agency in charge 
which held the department accountable if there was a mistake. 188 If newspapers printed 
unfavourable material, licences were revoked and offending publications punished. The 
Chinese media was part of the government propaganda machine with its role as 'the 
throat and tongue of the party': 'Comrades' on the journalism front were instructed to 
'serve socialism better' and reminded that their most important task was to make 
'positive propaganda' .189 
The Chinese press is affected more by internal politics than the market pressures that 
influence liberal media societies such as Japan, as most newspapers are government-
controlled and although editorial staff may have some say in placement and structure, it 
is ultimately Xinhua dominated material. Unlike newspaper content in democratic 
societies that can be influenced by a number of groups, Chinese newspaper content is 
1nostly 1nanipulated by the government. Although advertisers play a much larger role in 
the Chinese newspaper industry than ever before, they still have little say in content, 
particularly with the mainstream newspapers. Major newspapers are less affected by 
co1n1nercial consideration as government resources fund publishing together with state 
institutions (work units) that are forced to subscribe to many of the main newspapers, 
such as the Renniinribao. With ·only government financial support, unlike some of their 
more independently financed counterparts in Taiwan and Hong Kong, Chinese 
newspapers are dependent on the government. This is justified by the government as it is 
party not profit control and is regarded as 'public service journalism' which is 'superior 
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In China, the newspaper proprietor and dictator of editorial policy is usually the 
government. The only other potential influence on content is that of the editorial staff. In 
1989, editorial staff from the Renminribao and other media workers, protested against 
the government with students and, 'marched down the streets of Beijing clamouring for 
a free press and a faster pace of reform' .191 Despite the harsh punishment inflicted on 
these protestors, editorial staff are still able to have some contribution in article 
placement through subtle suggestion. The ability of the editorial staff to influence 
content is however more possible with domestic rather than foreign issues. Foreign 
policy, especially towards superpowers is 'the least likely arena for open policy 
disagreement in the press' .192 It is one of the sensitive areas in which the government is 
least tolerant of dissent. 
In China, the media does not affect government policy but is instead restrained by it as 
the politically sensitive nature of many issues ensures that important articles are 
carefully constructed. Although the editorial staff may have some say in article 
placement, important issues are placed in accordance with Xinhua (government) 
directives. Consequently, the media has little effect on policy in China and serves to 
mobilise the public to reinforce the actions of the regime. Traditionally the Chinese 
media has not been a forum for any debate or public disagreement as foreign policy 
related articles were regarded as 'obviously risky' and came from only one source-
Xinhua. 193 However, despite the media still remaining under some CCP control, the last 
few years, particularly after Premier Zhu Rongji announced in 1997 that 'all enterprises 
should move towards the market economy,' a liberalising of the media has occurred and 
greater independent influence on press content which is more entertainment-based than 
ever before. 194 In the case of the Diaoyu dispute, the Chinese government's basic policy 
was reinforced by the state-controlled press with regular statements such as 'the Diaoyu 
Islands are sovereign Chinese territory is an indisputable fact,' 195 which appears in the 
opening sentences of most Senkaku related articles in the Chinese press. However 
indicators of slight change in the nature of the Chinese press were evident with subtle 
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dissension on the level of policy aggressiveness amongst the newspapers which will be 
discussed later in the chapter. 
China's Diaoyu (Senkaku) Policy 
The Chinese government agreed initially with the Japanese government in the 1970s to 
'shelve the issue' and allow 'future generations' to solve the dispute in the interests of 
good relations. 196 They have also insisted however that both 'historically and legally' the 
islands belong to them. 197 From soon after the 'Lighthouse Incident', the Chinese 
government insisted that the Japanese had 'violated Chinese sovereign territory' and that 
the Japanese government must 'promptly take measures to ensure harm (to Sino-
Japanese relations) is not done'. 198 The Chinese have declared that they are willing to 
solve the dispute by way of friendly discussion, provided it was mutually accepted that 
'the islands belong to China'. 199 The Chinese position on the dispute was according to 
the Jiefangjunbao 'firm and unshakeable' ,200 and newspaper articles constantly 
reiterated this point aggressively. As the Renminribao declared: 
No Chinese will surrender the country's territory and sovereignty to anyone. 
If anybody dares do so, he will be cursed for centuries. 201 
From the beginning of the new round of dispute related tensions 1n July 1996, the 
Chinese stood firm and assertive on their position. 
The CCP' s policy on the islands, like the LDP' s, has been firm and unwavering. Since 
the first voices of dissent were expressed in 1972, the Chinese government have insisted 
on their right to island sovereignty. However, like their Japanese counterparts, the 
Chinese government through m·edia outlets have also constantly reaffirmed the need for 
bilateral stability. Although there has been an aggressive attitude displayed by the 
Chinese government, the state-media has been carefully utilised. Domestic anger has 
been addressed in the press through 'the usual vitriol about Japanese militarism and the 
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country's history of atrocities in China'. 202 However, it also has revealed that public 
sentiment in a authoritarian society can be a potential threat to the regime if the issue is 
volatile enough. Has this been the case with the Senkaku dispute? 
Japan, as China's largest trade partner,203 is considered carefully in the formation of 
Chinese foreign policy as the Chinese government is aware of the high levels of 
Japanese investment, foreign aid and trade with China. After the Tianamen Massacre in 
June 1989, Japan 'more rapidly returned to economic cooperation with China ... than did 
Western countries' .204 Taylor notes that 'views of Japan loom large in Chinese policy 
thinking' and that the Chinese government have stated that political and economic 
cooperation with Japan are vital to not only 'mutual prosperity' but also to the 'peace 
and development of the region as a whole' .205 Although both countries acknowledge the 
importance of bilateral relations, the Senkaku dispute complicated these relations and 
stirred volatile issues in China such as sovereignty and nationalism. 
The Chinese government has maintained its appearance as aggressive and anti-Japanese, 
declaring that there is 'no arguing the Chinese position' regarding ownership of the 
islands. 206 Chinese foreign policy is more affected by internal politics than in democratic 
nations as policy is made in the supposed best interests of the public and dissension is 
not tolerated. Greatly improved economic conditions in China have enabled the 
government to justify relations with previous 'enemies of the people' such as Japan. 
However, the anti-Japanese sentiment was continually reinforced by the Chinese 
government, using 'propaganda campaigns, exhibits depicting Japanese wartime 
atrocities, and anniversaries of past Japanese acts of aggression to exploit these popular 
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Public Sentiment in China 
Sentiment in China is tightly mobilised or suppressed by the regime. The government is 
aware of the diversity of groups, opinion and sentiment within Chinese society as with 
the world's largest population of 1.2 billion, the ruling party is careful not to let 
disruptive diversity in opinion threaten internal stability. With 55 minority groups, a 
widening poverty gap, centuries old divisions between North and South, and increasing 
differences between the development of flourishing coastal cities and stagnating inland 
towns, China is full of uncertainty and the ruling elite increasingly struggles to keep 
sentiinent tightly controlled. 
The expression of Chinese public sentiment over the last half-century has had an 
oppressive history. Mao invited public comment on his newly formed government in the 
mid-l 950s with the 'Hundred Flowers Campaign'. The campaign initially encouraged 
intellectuals to offer constructive criticism about the new communist government half a 
decade after it came to power. However, this was followed by a vicious turning on those 
who contributed and spoke out against government corruption and incompetence as 
many of those who criticised were imprisoned or killed. This resulted in an even greater 
restraining of public expression and was followed a decade later by the 'Ten Bad Years' 
and the 'turbulence' of the Cultural Revolution which crippled the country.208 Millions 
of innocent lives suffered and were lost during the turmoil, which resulted in a brutal 
precedent against the expression of any form of public dissent. 
Despite the opening of Chinese doors to the ideas, technologies and structures of 
democratic and developed nations, the legacy of this brutality left most of the Chinese 
public in fear of voicing dissent. Human rights abuses still plague the regime' s record 
and sentiment that opposes government policy is not tolerated and harshly dealt with. 
This history has set a precedent in China, where people realise that to voice independent 
opinion means severe punishment. This legacy remains and the expression of sentiment 
in China is still monitored by the government as indicated recently as relatives of those 
208 S.E.M. Charlton. Comparing Asian Politics: India, China and Japan . Westview Press, Colorado, 
1997, pp. 158,198 . 
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killed in the Tiananmen Massacre were carefully monitored during the 10th anniversary 
of the crackdown. 209 
Despite numerous demonstrations and intense media coverage in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, the Chinese public had little opportunity to express opinion and demonstrate. 
Protests in Hong Kong and Taiwan were scarcely mentioned in China for fear of similar 
acts erupting: 'Beijing's refusal to bow to pressure on China's campuses for students to 
stage similar de1nonstrations was seen as an indication the Government was not 
confident it could control the direction of large scale protests' .210 The Chinese 
govern1nent prohibited any public display of Diaoyu backlash and anti-Japanese 
demonstration. Although the Yomiuri noted the 'restraining' of a small planned 
demonstration in Beijing,211 this was an exception and the Chinese public were kept 
quiet. Bitter memories of the last mass expression of sentiment and its bloody resolution 
have plagued the CCP since 1989. Liberal reform and greater freedom of speech that 
emerged in the 1980s was quickly repressed after Tiananmen. The 'clamp down' caused 
a severe 'narrowing of outlets for divergent voices'. Mass opinion continued to be 
informed by a range of news sources that 'reinforce accepted dogma and politico-
cultural stereotypes' .212 
Despite authoritarian government control in China, the expression of public opinion still 
poses a threat to the ruling elite, as over the last few years, the collapse and closure of 
many state owned enterprises has created much civil unrest and even resulted in large-
scale anti-government protests in some cities. The lead up to the Hong Kong Handover 
was also unsettling for the government as Muslim separatists exploded a bomb in 
central Beijing and riots occurred in North West in early 1997.213 Over the last few 
years, despite limited coverage in the Chinese media, China has been experiencing 
increasing unrest and public demonstrations by disgruntled state workers. The 
expression of public opinion in China tightly controlled, is potentially explosive and 
cause for much government concern as Chinese society remains unstable in the face of 
reform and change. 
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The Chinese government is concerned about expressions of sentiment and has 
responded harshly to protests, as the country experiences social, economic and political 
changes as government control becomes less centralised, indicated recently with the 
province of Sichuan gaining semi-autonomous status in 1997. Despite such changes, the 
Chinese government through the media claims to represent the collective sentiment of 
all Chinese people as the state-controlled press constantly uses unifying words and 
speaks on behalf of 'the people' .214 The newspapers claim in articles that 'this is what 
the Chinese people think', or 'this is what the Chinese people want'. Articles from all 
Chinese newspapers after Nishimura' s landing proclaimed, 'We (the Chinese) express 
strong indignation and protest' .215 Such typical commentary reveals the nature of the 
, 216 D . . . d Chinese press as a 'mouthpiece for the government . esp1te c1v1l unrest an 
dissension throughout China, the media continues to portray a harmonious and 
prosperous society with a people unified in sentiment. 
Despite of authoritarian government control, sentiment in China poses a threat to the 
stability of the regime. China's instability and the government's constant struggle to 
balance a dying ideology with a rapidly developing economy is inhibited by the threat of 
large-scale expressed sentiment disagreeing with Chinese government policy. To avoid 
this, the government must take certain measures such as refusing permission to 
demonstrate, deal harshly with dissidents, and spy on potential 'trouble-makers'. Some 
public opinion was voiced regarding the dispute but was suppressed by the government. 
In the summer of 1996, students used the university's e-mail system to spread related 
information that the government had not released and challenged the CCP for 'not being 
tough enough'. The Chinese government responded by denying web access to university 
students for ten days and one activist was 'banished' to the inland province of 
Qinghai.217 
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The presence of existing and 'widely resonating' 218 anti-Japanese sentiment combined 
with the territorial dispute caused concern for the Chinese government. The Chinese 
government feared mass expression of anti-Japanese sentiment with memories of a 
government supported protest against the Japanese in 1985 that turned into an attack on 
the Chinese government's policies. 219 Another Chinese government concern is that 
excessive anti-Japanese sentiment could have a negative impact on invaluable Japanese 
investment and trade relations. As Austin and Thomas note: 'China desperately needs 
Japan as an economic partner' 220 and China could not afford to let the relationship be 
adversely affected by the dispute. 
Media-Sentiment-Policy Relationship in China 
In China, the media-sentiment-policy relationship is easier to define than in democratic 
societies such as Japan. Despite China's slow road to liberalisation and the public's 
greater access to outside information, the CCP still controls the official media and acts 
to suppress unfavourable sentiment. The formation of Chinese foreign policy operates in 
a tightly controlled environment. The media as a carefully manipulated extension of the 
state, plays no prominent role in policy making; instead it feeds the people with 
propaganda to support its policies and praises the 'greatness' of China and the 
Communist Party. Japan's attempt to control the Senkaku Islands and its 'wanton 
trampling of China's sovereignty' was 'condemned by the Chinese government and the 
Chinese media' .221 The Chinese government, regarding issues of nationalism tightly 
controls the role of the media. 
The May 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, has provided a recent 
example of the CCP's continued manipulation of the press. Despite NATO leaders and 
US President Bill Clinton · apologising for the bombing, these apologies were 
deliberately withheld from the Chinese press for 48 hours. 222 This indicated the media's 
role in China of propagating support for the regime. The delay in publishing NA TO 
apologies served to reinforce anti-US public sentiment that the Chinese government 
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wanted to be publicly expressed. The NATO incident was carefully used by the Chinese 
government to manipulate the media and focus on the bombing without news of 
apologies in order to mobilise anti-US sentiment amongst the Chinese people. This is an 
example of the regime's ability to use the media to mobilise and pacify sentiment. 
Senkaku coverage in the Chinese press was also carefully manipulated as the dispute 
was kept low key and a lack of information to the public helped ensure it would cause 
little controversy in China. 
The Chinese media publishes carefully and often omits potentially volatile information. 
The dispute's only fatality, the drowning of Hong Kong activist David Chan, went 
largely unreported on the Mainland. Apart from The China Daily and one 'smallish' 
newspaper, 'television newscasters completely ignored it' and newspapers instead, 
'dished up the usual vitriol about Japanese militarism and the country's history of 
atrocities in China' .223 The Chinese government's efforts to mostly ignore the incident 
reflected underlying concerns that despite anti-Japanese rhetoric being a key part of the 
regimes nationalist image, the dispute was not worth jeopardising relations and a 
contained domestic audience was vital. 
Despite the controls and restrictions 1n China, the three-way relationship between 
foreign policy, the media and the public is slowly changing and is increasingly affected 
by both internal and external factors. The change is a move away from total government 
control to increasing liberalisation. The influence of the international community is 
playing a major role in these changes as pressure from democratic governments and 
human rights groups around the world have contributed to a more open Chinese society. 
The Chinese people no have greater public access to information through the internet, 
foreign radio broadcasts, satellite television, and external news sources have forced the 
CCP to accept less control over the flow of information into China. 
The increased information flow has also contributed to a rise in different organisations. 
Despite authoritarianism being a 'dominant feature of the political system' , the 
emergence of new political ideas and organisations is a partial by-product of the 
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'profound changes occurring' in China and the political, economic and administrative 
reforms taking place. 224 However, this is occurring as civil unrest rises , 'with people 
angry about corruption and workers uneasy about their jobs' 225 as disillusionment in 
Party ideology spreads. As societal disharmony emerges, the Chinese government is 
increasingly called upon to justify its rule. In the dispute, a challenge to the 
government's patriotism was made by the Chinese public and the people in Hong Kong 
as the Chinese government refused to take affirmative action against the Japanese 
despite calls to do so. The dilemma of creating foreign policy that appeases both an 
international and domestic audience is reflected in media coverage of the dispute. 
Newspaper Analysis in China after the Lighthouse Incident 
The Chinese state-controlled press, compared to its counterparts in Hong Kong and 
Japan, had limited dispute coverage and articles that contributed little to an 
understanding of related events and the actual nature and progression of the dispute as 
editorial opinion and government propaganda were usually the same pieces of rhetoric. 
The government agenda appeared to keep the incident low key yet still acted in a 
manner to sufficient to appear to defy the Japanese in line with nationalistic rhetoric for 
the domestic audience. From the three newspapers, over a two-year period only 51 
articles were published, less than one third that appeared in the three Japanese 
newspapers. 
Articles in the Chinese press were limited but direct, and attacked not only Japan's 
territorial claims but also constantly 'dished up' the 'usual vitriol' against Japan, 
including war crimes and militarism,226 as even the Yasukuni Shrine visitation received 
more media attention than the Senkaku dispute. Most articles reiterated the Chinese 
government's position and only made passing reference to the latest dispute related 
events. The Renniinribao published the most articles (20) over the two-year period, The 
China Daily published 19 and the Jiefangjunbao only 13. 
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Renminribao (The People's Daily) 
The Renminribao published a total of 20 related articles over the period, only one more 
than The China Daily, but almost double the number in the Liberation Daily. Despite 
the 'Lighthouse Incident' occurring on July 14th 1996, nothing was mentioned until July 
19th. The article quoted the Chinese Foreign Ministry which condemned the act as a 
'violation of China's sovereignty' and called on the Japanese government to 'promptly 
take measures to avoid bilateral harm and soothe the situation'. 227 The newspaper also 
included a full-page article on the issue of 'Diaoyu ownership'. The article explained in 
detail historically and legally \vhy the islands 'rightfully belong to China'. Although the 
article also referred to the Japanese government's argument, the focus was on why the 
activities of the Japanese rightists were are 'illegal' and 'violated Chinese 
· , 228 sovereignty . 
After the Japanese politician Nishimura landed on the islands in May 1997, the 
Reruninribao published two separate articles in the one edition. The first article 
appeared on page four in the yaowen (important news) section, the other in the 
international news section on page six. The first article attacked the Japanese 
government and ultrarightists and protested strongly against the 'illegal landing'. The 
second article, two pages later, commended the Japanese government's criticism of 
Nishimura. 229 The paper also published a small article in May 1997 about an ex-
Japanese prime minister's criticism of Nishimura' s landing on the island. 230 This was a 
--
cri ticis1n that did not appear in the mainstream Japanese newspapers. The most 
aggressive article appeared as an editorial on page-one, entitled 'Japan don't do anything 
foolish'. 231 The article declared that 'Japan has used the changes after the Cold War to 
show it's power and test the resolve of China over the islands'. 
The Renniinribao also included two references to articles in the Japanese liberal 
newspaper, the Asahi. The first was an editorial that appeared in September 1996 (also 
in the Jiefangjunbao ), that called on the Japanese Prime Minister to 'not cause harm to 
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Sino-Japanese relations' and claimed that Hashimoto 'must do two things,' firstly think 
of a way to 'clearly express the damage caused by the ultrarightists by building the 
lighthouse', and secondly that 'during his term of office as prime minister, not to visit 
the Yasukuni Shrine again' .232 The second appeared in May 1997, which criticised the 
Japanese govern1nent after Nishimura' s landing, for failing to prevent it and continuing 
to 'harm relations with China' .233 In May 1997, five articles were published, and in 
June-July 1998 only one. The articles contained headlines considerably less aggressive 
than in 1996 and as mentioned above, included comments from Japanese officials 
condemning rightist actions, suggesting that some policy adjustment had taken place. 
lief angjunbao (Liberation Army Daily) 
From July 1996 until the end of October, only ten articles were published in the 
Jiefangjunbao. In May 1997, only two appeared in the paper, and none in June-July of 
1998. Although the articles in the Jiefangjunbao were mostly identical to those 
published in the Renminribao and also appeared on the same day there were some slight 
differences. The dispute gained front-page status four times in the Jiefangjunbao, as 
opposed to the Reruninribao, which although publishing related articles, only had two 
on the front page. Both papers had scathing anti-Japanese front-page articles on 30 
August. The following day, another front-page article appeared in the Liberation Daily 
whilst the Peoples' Daily article appeared on page three. This suggested a slightly more 
aggressive attitude from the military and is an exainple of increased permissible opinion 
diversity within mainstream Chinese society. In contrast to the Peoples' Daily front-
page editorial on 30 August, the Jiefangjunbao, carried a heading claiming 'The 
Japanese have created a disturbance on our Diaoyu Islands'. The article condemned the 
Japanese for 'ignoring China·' s solemn position', and 'seriously violating China's 
sovereign territory'. The article continued on to declare that the ultrarightists acted 
'under the connivance of the Japanese government' .234 
After Nishimura' s landing, the condemnation of his act by the Japanese Prime Minister 
and the govern1nent was given coverage. The article stated that the incident was 
'extremely regrettable ' but that 'i t should not harm overall relations between Japan and 
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China, which are important for both regional and world harmony and prosperity'. 235 
Although the article claimed the landings to be illegal and still referred to the islands as 
'ours', the content showed support for the actions of the Japanese government and 
revealed some mutual government agreement on which antagonists were to blame. 
The China Daily 
From July 1996 until the end of October, The China Daily contained only 19 articles on 
the dispute. This was almost the same number as in the leading vernacular publication, 
the Renminribao. However, it is only half the number carried by its Japanese equivalent, 
The Japan Times. Although the dispute was treated cautiously by all newspapers in 
China, with an international audience, The China Daily was more sensationalist with 
'appeals' to an international readership. Commenting on the Chinese government's use 
of the English language publications in China, Gries notes: 
Lengthy English language articles in the China Daily and Beijing Review 
also made the case for Chinese sovereignty over the Islands. Their purpose, 
however, was likely twofold: to marshal western opinion against Japan, and, 
probably more importantly, to assuage domestic critics by appearing to 
champion Chinese nationalism internationally.236 
As China strives to gain greater acceptance 1n the world, its English language 
propaganda on international issues such as territorial disputes becomes increasingly 
important. 
Although The China Daily contained . similar anti-Japanese 'vitriol' to the vernacular 
press, it was able to comment more widely on events and was the only mainstream 
newspaper to mention Chan's drowning. As in the vernacular press, the activities of 
Chinese protestors, from any of the three Chinese states, was scarcely mentioned. The 
main emphasis was on the stance of the Chinese government and the usual anti-I apanese 
propaganda accusing Japan in one article of 'embarking on the road to confrontation' .237 
After the heightened tensions of 1996, The China Daily also appeared less aggressive in 
1997 and 1998. In May 1997 only two articles appeared, compared to five in the 
Renniinribao. In June-July 1998 only two were published and despite the alleged 
235 Jiefangjunbao. 'Ribenshumingyiyuanfeifadengshangwodiaoyudao'. May 7, 1997, p.5. 
236 P .Gries . 'China's Occident: The 'Japanese devils', the 'war of resistance ', and the Diaoyu Islands'. 
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sinking of the Taiwanese protest vessel, only two articles commented on the incident. 
The dispute despite the dramatic collison of vessels, appeared to be less volatile than in 
1996. 
Effect on Diaoyu Policy in China 
Chinese media coverage of the dispute was considerably low profile. The Chinese 
newspapers 1nade little reference to the protests taking place over the border in Hong 
Kong or across the Strait in Taiwan. The only reference to these protests appeared in the 
Renminribao in June 1998 when it was reported that a Japanese ship had 'destroyed' a 
Taiwanese boat. The article was not focused on the Taiwanese protest but on the 
da1nage caused by the Japanese to the Taiwanese ship.238 Unlike The China Daily which 
clearly stated the boat had been sunk, the Renminribao declared that much damage had 
been done but not that the boat had necessarily been sunk. 
The Chinese government through the press, constantly reminded the Japanese that it was 
solely to blame for bilateral problems. The Chinese government claimed regularly that 
the Japanese were harming bilateral relations and that Japan should 'make greater 
efforts to maintain peace and prosperity in Asia'. 239 Despite this, the Chinese have done 
little more than threaten. Calls from Taiwan and Hong Kong for the Chinese 
government to 'protect Chinese territory' were responded to by empty __threats by a 
Chinese government. The closest act of aggression from China was the flying of two Su-
27 fighters over the island's air space in August 1995.240 However since the dispute 
escalated in July 1996, no such further action took place. In mid 1996 according to the 
Japanese Yoniiuri Shinibun, 241 the Chinese government dispatched two submarines into 
the area. However, this was not reported in the Chinese press, but rather in the Japanese 
press. Why was a perceivably strong act carried out by the Chinese government not 
followed up with nationalistic rhetoric? The aggressive rhetoric of eth Chinese 
government appears to have been nothing more than a means to address the domestic 
237 The China Daily. 'Diaoyu intrusions protested'. September 12, 1996, p.1. 
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audience and 'to champion Chinese nationalism internationally'. The Chinese 
newspapers have reflected this policy of defiance without action. 
All three Chinese newspapers heavily emphasised the Japanese government's relations 
with the ultrarightists and insisted that the Japanese group had built the lighthouse and 
acted under the 'connivance of the Japanese government' .242 The Chinese newspapers 
made constant reference to the Japanese 'violation of Chinese sovereign territory', and 
the 'indignation felt by the Chinese people'. Most of the articles started with: 'the 
islands have belonged to China since ancient times'. The Senkaku related articles 
revealed the depth of the media-state relationship and reinforced the view that the 
Chinese press is a mere instrument of the state. 
The Chinese newspapers also used the dispute to condemn other Japanese actions. 
These included the Yasukuni Shrine visit and the US-Japan defence treaty, both of 
which according to the Renminribao, made relations with Japan 'difficult' .243 The 
Senkaku dispute was often discussed together with the Japanese government's denial of 
Nanjing massacre statistics, war atrocities and Japanese school textbook omissions, 
confirming that the Chinese government use the past as a, 'convenient tool to skilfully 
manipulate Japan' .244 This dispute has been no exception, with newspapers on the 
Mainland portraying China once again, as being the victim of a 'militant Japan'. Such 
articles continued to expose the depth of anti-Japanese sentiment which, despite its 
regular appearance in the press, was forbidden on the streets. 
The Chinese newspapers printed provocative headings and constantly used 'ours' when 
referring to the islands. They press also used 'our' when referring to the 'indignation 
suffered' by the Chinese people and were continually 'championing' the cause for 'the 
people'. The Jiefangjunbao contained a map of the islands and the surrounding area, 
labelling the map 'Our country's territory' .245 Other article headlines included, 'Our 
Foreign Ministry protests strongly ... ,' 246 'We will not shift our position ... ' 247 and 'We 
242 Jiefanfjunbao. 'Ribenzaiwodiaoyudaozhizaoshiduanlingrenfenkai'. August 30, 1996, p.1. 
243 Renminribao. 'Zailishijiaoxunjichushangjiaqiangrizhongguanxi'. September 19, 1996, p.6. 
244 H. Ijiri in P.Gries . 'China's Occident: The 'Japanese devils', the 'war of resistance', and the Diaoyu 
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245 Jiefanfjunbao. 'Diaoyudaoliedaoshizhongguoguyoulingtu'. August 30, 1996, p.4. 
246 Jiefanfjunbao. 'Wowaiguobuxiangrifangtichuqiangliekangyi'. September 12, 1996, p.1. 
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express indignation and protest' .248 The Chinese newspapers expressed to 'the people ' 
that this was a complete affront to the Chinese people. 
There were some slight differences between the Renminribao and the Jiefangjunbao. In 
contrast to the Jiefangjunbao, the Renniinribao contained less all-inclusive headlines 
such as language regarding the dispute. On 7 May, in contrast to the Liberation Daily' s 
claim that 'we' feel indignation, the Renminribao stated that 'China feels indignation' 
regarding the Nishimura incident. The Renniinribao published the news on page four in 
contrast to the Jiefangjunbao which carried a front-page article, stressing that 'we' feel 
the indignation. The use of 'us' (as in 'we' the Chinese) is a common style of 
propaganda in China, which is another example of the regime claiming to represent the 
collective interests and sentiment of the people. The differences between the two 
newspapers although slight, reflected significant changes in the nature of the Chinese 
media from a united front of propaganda to a place of slowly appearing variance of 
foreign policy opinion, revealing changes in the Chinese press towards a more liberal 
entity. 
All three Chinese newspapers contained articles about a Japanese historian supporting 
the Chinese claim. Kiyoshi Inoue first published his paper 'The Tiaoyu Islands (Senkaku 
Islands) and other islands are China's territory', in the February 1972 edition of the 
Japan-China Cultural Exchange. After the 'Lighthouse Incident' in 1996, another 
edition of the publication was released with a new preface that reiterated that 'the 
islands belong to China'. The new edition also included a condemnation of the 
ultrarightist 'Lighthouse Incident'. 249 This, like most articles in the Chinese press, were 
part of an argu1nent the Chinese government was trying to make, to justify wresting the 
islands from the Japanese. 
Media observation revealed slight policy adjustment in China. The style of reporting in 
Chinese newspapers changed gradually from July 1996 when headlines were based on 
announcements from the Foreign Affairs Bureau on incidents that had taken place.250 By 
late August, headlines were condemning the Japanese openly on behalf of all Chinese 
248 Jiefanfjunbao. 'Wobiaoshiqiangliefenkaihekangyi '. May 7, 1997, p.1. 
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people expressing 'indignation' and that 'Chinese sovereign territory had been gravely 
violated' .251 In September 1997, China and Japan agreed to a joint control zone in the 
East China Sea. This 'effectively broke the deadlock on what status to give the islands 
in a future delimitation' .252 This was reflected indirectly by a reversion back to less 
emotive headlines when the next confrontation around the islands took place. In June 
1998 the 'ramming' of a Taiwanese protest boat by a Japanese MSA ship was reported 
with a headline that had reverted once again to being a Foreign Affairs Bureau 
Announcement. 253 By this time, the two governments were moving closer to a joint 
settlement and wanting the issue resolved. 
Articles published in the Chinese vernacular press, just after the 'Lighthouse Incident' in 
mid-July, noted as previously mentioned, that 'friendly discussions' to resolve the issue 
could take place conditionally, if China's sovereignty was to be agreed upon. By late 
August according to the Renniinribao, that had become 'that the issue must be shelved 
or joint exploration would only be acceptable if China has sovereignty' .254 Obstacles to 
joint settlement eventually faded as the Chinese realised economic imperatives 
outweighed any domestic nationalist benefit that could be gained from conflict with 
Japan. As Downs and Saunders reinforce: 
The Chinese government proved willing to incur significant damage to its 
nationalist credentials by following restrained policies and cooperating with 
the Japanese government to prevent the territorial disputes from harming 
bilateral relations. When forced to choose, Chinese leaders pursued 
economic development at the expense of nationalist goals. 255 
Despite heated rhetoric, the Chinese government acknowledged the need to stabilise 
bilateral relations and opted for long term economic gain in preference to a short-term 
show of domestic rhetoric which was reflected in the Chinese government's policy 
adjustment. 
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The Hong Kong Factor 
China is under international scrutiny with its dealings in Hong Kong and overt restraints 
on freedom of speech and press restrictions would be detrimental to the international 
image of the Chinese government. Hong Kong must focus on its own economic 
concerns and continue good relations with important trading partner Japan, which will 
also benefit China. The Chinese government will pay increasing attention to the people 
of Hong Kong who provide China with its most successful bilateral link to the 
international com1nunity. The expression of heated sentiment against Japan and even 
China is cause for concern and policy adjustments will take place to avoid this. 
The burning Japanese flags 256 and severed Chinese heads257 on the pages of one of Hong 
Kong's most respected newspapers, Mingpao, reflected the intense coverage given to 
the dispute by the Hong Kong media. Without any independent foreign policy and since 
1997 centrally controlled by Beijing, Hong Kong is included within the present 
discussion of China. The dispute created much interest in Hong Kong which was further 
excited by dramatic press coverage. With no local foreign policy to influence and no 
independent Senkaku policy, the media and public sentiment in Hong Kong created 
concern for the Chinese government. Examining Hong Kong provides some insight into 
general Chinese public opinion that is not permitted expression in China. How did this 
indirect influence caused the Chinese government to react? How did the authoritarian 
regi1ne respond to the unusual situation in Hong Kong, whereby people under central 
jurisdiction were able to protest relatively freely and openly challenge Beijing's 
Senkaku policy? 
This section briefly comments on the Hong Kong media and two of its maJor 
newspapers, the Mingpao and the South China Morning Post. Unlike the Chinese 
public, the people and media in Hong Kong represented an overt and active form of 
pressure on the Chinese government. Under British rule, Hong Kong has been a bustling 
economy where escaped dissidents from China, entrepreneurs, film-makers, writers and 
journalists have all been able to express themselves. Unlike their communist 
256 Mingpao. 'Gangbaodiaozhitotiayangqi'. May 13, 1997, p.A3. 
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neighbours, people in Hong Kong live in a free consumer society where the media in 
particular, has provided professional comment and opinion on a variety of issues both 
domestic and international. 
Until mid-1997 Hong Kong existed under British rule with relative freedom to express 
sentiment and publish newspapers in a market environment. As a bastion of democracy 
in a region of strict regimes, Hong Kong has prospered economically and behind Japan 
is the most liberal society in Asia. The democratically elected Hong Kong Legislative 
Council has been the main ruling body on the island with the Governor acting as the 
Queen's representative and unofficial Head of State. Although Hong Kong is without 
independent policy, the city still has bilateral relations with other countries based on 
open market policy and international standards. This has enabled Hong Kong successful 
diplomatic and trade relations with other nations, including Japan which are quite 
separate from the often tense bilateral ties China has with these countries. Japan as a key 
trading partner has always been important to Hong Kong and tension between China and 
Japan has often been avoided by Hong Kong. 
Until the handover to Chinese rule in 1997, the British largely determined Hong Kong 
foreign policy. After the handover, Beijing has controlled policy and despite now being 
under communist rule, according to the Sino-British Joint Declaration signed by the 
British and the Chinese in 1984, Hong Kong's system is to remain 'basically 
unchanged' for a period of 50 years. 258 The economic success of Hong Kong has 
contributed to relative harmony since World War II, despite the decades of turbulence in 
neighbouring communist China. Since the handover, despite some economic downturn 
and wariness of communist interference, Hong Kong has been allowed to maintain a 
relatively free society and continues to govern itself in all areas except foreign affairs 
and defence and it 'appears to be working' .259 
Hong Kong is proud of its vernacular press that provides a complete range of opinion 
from pro- to anti-communist, international, liberal and conservative, English language 
newspapers of international reputation and a number of colourful tabloid style papers. 
Despite a return to communist China, Hong Kong is still trying to preserve a free press 
258 B. Gilley. 'Tightening the bolts '. Far Eastern Economic Review. April 25, 1996, p.16. 
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which with an increasingly competitive market, is also affected by the need for exciting 
copy. As in Japan, four groups; proprietors, the government, editorial staff and 
advertisers, can influence media content in Hong Kong. In most cases, as financially 
independent groups in a relatively liberal society, despite some wariness of Beijing, 
Hong Kong newspapers publish freely in accordance with their respective policies. 
Due to recent economic difficulties however, newspapers in Hong Kong have become 
even greater prey to market forces. As noted in the Far Eastern Econoniic Review, the 
biggest threat to media freedom after the handover is not China but falling ethical 
standards of local reporting, 'when survival becomes the dominant concern, market 
considerations outweigh all' .260 As mentioned in Chapter One, in such a competitive 
environment, stories are often prioritised in order of excitement value including sex and 
violence. The Senkaku dispute provided newspapers in Hong Kong with ample copy of 
popular stories related to old foe Japan and drama on the 'high seas' 261 which are 
sensitive issues in Hong Kong, as it still remembers Japanese war atrocities and is 
increasingly vulnerable after the handover to the CCP' s rhetoric. However, since the 
handover, media credibility in Hong Kong has declined and an increase in sensationalist 
journalism has led to the 'public's low opinion' of the media in contrast to its 'elevated 
status' in the years leading up to the handover.262 Hence, the intensity of media coverage 
of the dispute may partly be related to the dispute providing newspapers with material 
that sells. 
Public sentiment in Hong Kong has been relatively freely expressed. The absence of 
com1nunist style oppression and the maintenance of the previous liberal system, has 
enabled the public to preserve the right to protest and express sentiment. General 
harmony and a good living standard have contributed to minimal domestic strife in 
Hong Kong under British rule. People in Hong Kong have been able to express 
sentiment and have often used this freedom to demonstrate peacefully, marking 
anniversaries and other special events. Since the handover, demonstrations have thus far 
been allowed to continue although with some caution. The recent remembering of the 
10th anniversary of the Tiananmen Massacre in June 1999, despite being subdued in 
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Beijing, was marked by a candlelight vigil in Hong Kong's Victoria Park, attended by 
seventy thousand people, 'each with their own stories to tell' .263 Such a display of 
sentiment reminds the Chinese government that the Hong Kong public still express 
opinion publicly and if the matter is important enough, in large numbers. 
Sentin1ent in Hong Kong is widely expressed and consists of a number of groups all 
expressing their opinions with varying intentions, resources, publicity and level of 
influence. Tensions over the Senkakus heightened and protests intensified in the lead up 
to the sovereignty handover in mid-1997. Anti-Japanese sentiment was evident in Hong 
Kong and although the dispute provided attractive news, underlying elements suggested 
that such fervour was greatly contributed to by 'handover anxiety', and 'people's 
frustration towards Beijing,' as well as 'some residents wanting to show their patriotism 
to the Chinese government' before July 1997. Japan was regarded as an 'easy target' to 
vent anger at because of its 'history of aggression' and 'some of its bumbling diplomatic 
performances'. 264 
As mentioned earlier, an article in the Mainichi reported on comments by a radio 
journalist in Hong Kong who questioned the money 'wasted' on the Diaoyu campaign, 
which could have been used for other things such as a 'children's hospital'. Blame for 
the drowning incident was also placed on the press by a Hong Kong politician who 
clai1ned that the 'Hong Kong media were largely responsible' for the death.265 Although 
the 1notives behind the intense Diaoyu campaign in Hong Kong were questioned, the 
local support received and the extent of mobilised sentiment and expression of interest 
was a clear threat to the bilateral harmony important to both the Chinese and Japanese 
governments . 
The media-senti1nent-policy relationship in Hong Kong is defined by a media sensitive 
to its audience and the various interest groups in Hong Kong as the press provides both 
opinion and entertainment to a large readership. As information flow increases between 
China and Hong Kong, the Chinese public are increasingly informed of activity and 
events outside China, more so than ever before. Does the expression of sentiment in 
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Hong Kong, particularly on issues important to many Chinese such as nationalis1n and 
sovereignty affect the public and government in China? 
Newspapers in Hong Kong provided readers much coverage of the dispute. In May 
1997, one of the leading newspapers and non-party publications, 266 Mingpao published 
28 articles which included two editorials, one banner headline and two full-page spreads 
on the dispute. Most coverage was in the form of at least a half page with large pictures 
and provocative headlines. One of the editorials was entitled 'Japan causes dispute to 
escalate', 267 the other editorial was entitled 'The threat of Japanese militarism escalates, 
Chinese tolerance means islands can't be defended'. The editorial attacked China and 
stated that 'China should not be silent and that something should be done' .268 The 
banner headline on May 27 after Chinese protest groups tried unsuccessfully to land on 
the islands, was 'Japanese MSA vessel violently obstructs, Baodiao (Protect the Diaoyu) 
ship fails to land' .269 Hong Kong newspaper attacks on Japan and the ultrarightists were 
often reported with references to Japanese war atrocities, militarism and even comfort 
women. 270 The Senkaku dispute provided the Hong Kong media with an opportunity to 
publish anti-Japanese rhetoric popular amongst readers. 
The South China Morning Post (SCMP) in the same month contained only seven 
Senkaku related articles. This included a page one article, an editorial and a cartoon. The 
SCMP of international repute, provided commentary much less emotive and anti-
Japanese than the vernacular press. The audience of the SCMP is an international 
expatriate community, more likely to be concerned with international events than anti-
Japanese war stories. In late May the SCMP published a cartoon which pictured a race 
starter complete with racing gun near the Senkaku Islands, reminding boats from Japan 
facing boats from Hong Kong and Taiwan (noticeably not China) that 'safety comes 
first'. 271 In June 1998, the SCMP published an editorial after the collision between a 
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Taiwanese protest vessel and an MSA ship, calling for crev.r members to consider 
'finally agreeing to what has become an annual fiasco' .272 
Japanese newspaper articles made considerable comment on the heated nature of the 
Hong Kong press reports. Dispute related titles included 'Get Lost Japan' and 'Chinese 
Citizens are angry' .273 The Mainichi article also reported the 'development of 
competitive info gathering' amongst the Hong Kong media, suggesting that Hong Kong 
reports were based less on genuine concern and objective opinion and more on 
sensationalism which catered to the readership in a competitive Hong Kong market for 
which the Senkaku dispute provided entertaining and provocative newspaper stories. 
The Hong Kong press was the most provocative of the three regions regarding the 
dispute. Articles criticised Japan, promoted local protests274 and challenged the Chinese 
government's inactivity with representatives from the Hong Kong Democratic Party 
appealing to Chinese government representatives at the Xinhua offices in Hong Kong 
for the Chinese government to take a stronger stance on the dispute. 275 The Hong Kong 
press also blamed China for Japan's 'repeated' actions that violated Chinese 
sovereignty.276 However, although no policy change can take place in Hong Kong, a 
slight shift was noted in China as joint settlement was eventually discussed. The heated 
nature of Hong Kong sentiment included, flag burning, demonstrations outside a local 
Japanese school, a call to boycott Japanese goods and a consulate sit-in. 277 These actions 
reminded the Chinese government that such sentiment if fuelled would be harmful to 
Sino-Japanese ties as Japanese tourist numbers to Hong Kong decreased in late 1996 at 
the height of Senkaku tension and anti-Japanese protests in Hong Kong. 278 
The resolution and eventual calming of dispute tension and related protests were clearly 
expressed in a South China Morning Post editorial. The editorial stated in late June 
1998 that, 'It is time for the participants to accept that te1Titorial disputes are settled at 
the negotiating table,' and that 'a breakthrough on thorny bilateral questions is more 
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likely to be achieved in a calm atmosphere than by confrontations'. Emphasis was 
placed on both countries needing to focus on economic concerns and continue the work 
of recent years to 'increase trade and establish friendlier relations' .279 The editorial 
questioned the value of risking lives and whether the protests had become counter-
productive. Clearly economic objectives and awareness in China of pressing socio-
economic needs had contributed to resolution and a decline in tension and rhetoric. 
Hong Kong protests were a reminder to the CCP that despite the need to balance 
do1nestic nationalism and bilateral harmony, the excessive stirring of Chinese 
nationalism could cause problems. Hong Kong also revealed to the Chinese government 
the potential harm that could result from anti-Japanese sentiment and the tension it 
could create for bilateral stability vital to the maintenance of important economic and 
political ties. Even without independent policy, protest activity and a sensational media 
in Hong Kong had some effect on the Chinese government. The slight shift in the 
Senkaku policy of the Chinese government reflected economic i1nperatives and the need 
to pacify volatile sentiment in Hong Kong and a media with sensationalist tendencies. 
Conclusion 
Despite efforts by the Chinese government to control the press and restrict sentiment, 
there has been some shift of China's policy towards the Senkakus. The i11fluence is not 
from sentiment expressed or media hype, but on what is not expressed and what is not 
printed. The difficulties faced by the present Chinese government are also exposed in 
the dispute. The government is trying to balance the needs of a country emerging from a 
strong socialist ideological background with an international community that China 
needs to cooperate with in order to develop as the 'strong demands of economics' 
underpin the 'fiery rhetoric of nationalism' that the Chinese government has used as a 
cornerstone of legitirnacy for many years.280 The dilemma faced by the CCP 1s 
continuing development and maintaining legitimacy through nationalist propaganda. 
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The Chinese media does not have much effect on foreign policy as it is a government 
instrument of propaganda. It is more likely however that public sentiment, brooding and 
suppressed, may have an effect on policy. Chinese government relations with the 
Japanese government are precarious with the constant threat of demonstrated anti-
Japanese sentiment leading to sentiment hostile to the Chinese government. The media 
fuels domestic dislike of the Japanese, but the government is aware of the need to 
maintain good relations with Japan as an invaluable investor and trading partner. 
Despite an absence of protests, the threat of excessive and volatile Chinese public 
sentin1ent has had some effect on policy. This has not changed the Chinese 
government's basic policy on the islands but it has seen the government downplay the 
event. This was even more pronounced after headway was made in late 1997 towards 
joint settlement. Government policy, due to widespread anti-Japanese feelings, must 
suppress public opposition and restrict information. However, this must be balanced 
with the usual display of nationalistic rhetoric. In order to do this, the government must 
take certain measures such as refusing permission to demonstrate against the Japanese, 
deal harshly with antagonists, and spy on potential 'trouble-makers'. This in itself is a 
response to sentiment. 
Changes in government attitudes to select expressions of sentiment have occurred since 
the prohibiting of large-scale Senkaku protests during the dispute in 1996, China has 
recently allowed government condoned protests in Beijing. The recent May 1999 
bo1nbing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade led to large government condoned anti-
US/N ATO protests in China: 'The Chinese authorities were quick to encourage the 
student's nationalism to gain · political mileage from the nation's genuine sorrow'. 281 
This has represented a shift in policy as the government appears less threatened by large 
gatherings and has displayed an increased confidence in dealing with such mass 
expressions of opinion. 
The use of the Senkaku dispute by the Chinese government to stir anti-Japanese 
sentiment through nationalist rhetoric was cautious. Newspaper articles although few, 
were aggressive and citing Japanese actions as offensive to all Chinese. Strong protests 
in Taiwan and as mentioned above, Hong Kong, combined with local repressed anti-
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Japanese feelings were potentially explosive on the Mainland. Despite threatening a 
'curse' against anyone taking Chinese territory, the Chinese eventually chose economic 
priorities and minimised local anti-Japanese sentiment. The public in China and their 
diversity of living conditions, needs and opinions, are a constant reminder to the CCP 
that caution must be exhibited when forming policy and trying to use volatile public 
sentiment to legitimise leadership. Even in an authoritarian regime such as China, 
sentiment has the potential to affect policy if the threat is large enough. It was in the 
case of the Senkaku dispute. 
28 1 L. O'Donnell. 'China blue '. The Weekend Australian. May 15-16, 1999, p.26. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis has been to examine the influence of media and public sentiment 
on the foreign policy of China and Japan in the case of the Senkaku Islands dispute. The 
dispute has involved a number of sensitive issues such as nationalism, territorial 
sovereignty, as well as political and economic consideration which have all impacted on 
'Senkaku policy' . The question of the influence of the media and public opinion on 
foreign policy has been widely researched although most focus has been on liberal 
democratic societies. This paper focuses on two Asian countries, Japan and China, one 
democratic and the other an authoritarian regime which recently took control of a region 
with liberal traditions, opinion and a press more akin to a liberal democracy than its 
host. The inclusion of Hong Kong provides insight into freely expressed Chinese 
sentiment regarding the dispute which was restricted in China by the government. 
The relationship between the media, public sentiment and foreign policy is determined 
by the individual political system in each country. The level of influence the media and 
public sentiment have over foreign policy has been the subject of much debate over the 
last few decades, particularly since the media coverage of the Vietnam War and the 
controversy that ensued. The level of influence is also affected by the type of policy and 
the general nature of public sentiment. Domestic policy with greater- relevance to 
everyday living, receives more media coverage and is more susceptible to external 
influences compared to the distant and often protected foreign policies of a government. 
Public sentiment is rarely unit_ed and usually consists of a diversity of views often with 
divergent interests. Consequently, governments can usually proceed with foreign policy 
formation relatively unhindered by the media or the public by contrast with domestic 
policy. 
Despite the media being a prominent entity in society, its ability to influence foreign 
policy is inhibited by a num.ber of factors. These include the often conflicting interests 
in media content by proprietors, editorial staff, advertisers and the government. The 
impact an event may have on government policy is also determined by the timing of the 
incident, the type of policy, the media outlet and the nature of the event itself. All these 
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factors are considered along with the structure of the media in liberal democratic 
societies such as Japan and Hong Kong which is influenced greatly by the market place, 
as newspapers are increasingly forced to response to audience tastes and sacrifice 
professional standards in order to entertain and avoid the loss of readership. 
Looking at the media from China, Japan, and Hong Kong to a lesser extent, I have 
examined newspapers as one outlet from which information on government policy can 
be obtained and as a source of expression of selected public sentiment. This research 
co1nmenced with the 'Lighthouse Incident' in July 1996 which reignited the Senkaku 
issue, and concluded in June 1998 when the most recent incident took place. During that 
time, external sources talked of a potential military clash as tensions peaked after the 
October 1996 landing of Chinese protestors on the islands. The dispute evolved from 
heated exchanges between both government and protesters in mid-1996, to an opening 
for resolution through joint exploration talks in September 1997 and slight but clear 
policy adjustment in both China and Japan. 
The basic Japanese government policy regarding the islands did not change. Already in 
possession of the islands the Japanese government maintained that the islands legally 
and historically belonged to them and therefore that they had the right to defend them. In 
mid-1996 the Japanese government did little to appease Chinese popular anger by not 
punishing or preventing nationalist activity. However, apart from the actions of Japanese 
ultranationalists, expression of public sentiment towards the dispute was minimal in 
Japan. Media coverage was also relatively subdued as Japanese newspapers provided 
objective updates and reported official comments about the dispute. Although the 
Japanese press appeared professional in their coverage, slight differences emerged in the 
editorial opinion and bias of these newspapers. 
The pro-government Yomiuri contributed little to the debate and was without the intense 
rhetoric of its Chinese counterpart the Renminribao. However, the Yomiuri did indicate 
subtlely through the careful use of select words such as 'territorial waters' that it 
supported the government's policy of territorial sovereignty. The liberal Mainichi also 
showed support for Japanese government policy with the use of the term 'territorial 
waters' but it also provided objective comment and some criticism of the Japanese 
government's initial refusal to respond to Japanese ultranationalists and ease tensions 
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with an increasingly angry Chinese government. The English language Japan Times 
provided its international readership with objective commentary and open debate on the 
dispute and the Japanese government's handling of the controversy. The impact of the 
media and public opinion on government policy in Japan was affected by external 
events such as defence relations with the U-S and tensions related to existing Chinese 
attitudes towards Japan's wartime history. 
By 1998 slight policy changes had occurred in Japan as the Japanese government 
showed a significant escalation in their resolve to defend the islands from Chinese 
protestors. The number of MSA vessels were increased and the government declared it 
would arrest illegal foreign national trespassers. The Japanese government also started 
to condemn ultrarightist activity in Japan and agreed to a joint control zone of nearby 
waters with the Chinese government as bilateral tension subsided considerably. Despite 
some slight alterations to Japanese policy, foreign policy in Japan is carefully insulated 
and influential determinants do not usually include the media and public sentiment. 
Although Japanese media analysis provided some insight into the nature of sentiment 
and the press in Japan, there was no indication that either factor had any major influence 
on the Senkaku policy of the Japanese government. Instead, Senkaku policy formation 
in Japan was based on economic security and prosperity and policy adjustments were a 
response to tension threatening bilateral stability and valued economic relations with 
China. 
The fundamental Senkaku policy of the Chinese government was based on the 
governments 'unwavering' insistence that the islands belonged to them. Although this 
basic policy did not change; policy adjustment did occur despite the efforts of an 
authoritarian regime to insulate themselves from influence by controlling the media and 
public sentiment. Despite an absence of overt public sentiment on the islands in China 
and the government restricting media coverage of the dispute, policy in China was more 
affected by sentiment than in Japan as the Chinese government sought to defuse anti-
Japanese sentiment. Chinese policy shifted from agreeing to 'shelve the issue' to 
offering joint settlement provided Japan acquiesced to 'Chinese sovereignty' and finally 
to talks with Japan on a joint control zone of the area. The Chinese government was 
adamant in the press about the 'strength' of Chinese conviction, the 'anger' of the 
Chinese people towards the Japanese government and the 'indignation' felt by the 
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Chinese people as Japanese ultranationalists appeared to act with the 'connivance' of the 
Japanese government. Although disallowing demonstrative expressions of public 
sentiment in China, Chinese news reports were aggressive and provocative and 
aggravated existing anti-Japanese sentiment. 
In Hong Kong the media and protest groups were also aggressive and provocative in 
their condemnation of the Japanese government, ultrarightists and even the Chinese 
government for their failure to act decisively against the Japanese who continued to 
'violate ' Chinese sovereignty. Public sentiment was clearly expressed with wide-scale 
assaults on the islands, consulate demonstrations, rallies, protests at a local Japanese 
school and even a call to boycott Japanese goods. These actions were given much 
coverage by the local media showing support for the anti-Japanese sentiment expressed 
by the Hong Kong public. As Japanese tourist numbers showed a decline in Hong Kong 
in late 1996, it appeared to the Chinese government that future rhetoric or actions to fuel 
existing and 'widely resonating' Japanese hatred would be detrimental and costly to 
crucial economic relations with Japan at a time when a struggling Chinese economy 
needed Japan. The threat to vital economic support and trade with Japan scared the 
Chinese government into downplaying their state-controlled media rhetoric and shifting 
policy slightly to accommodate economic priority over nationalistic sentiment. 
In China, media coverage decreased in intense rhetoric and even contained praise of the 
Japanese governments more decisive actions towards the ultrarightists without 
commenting on the Japanese governments increased defence and resolve to protect the 
islands . The Chinese government also agreed to consider joint exploration and appeared 
to move away from insisting that the Japanese must agree to Chinese sovereignty in 
order for the two countries to proceed with joint activities. As reflected in the media, the 
Chinese had clearly taken a step back and away from aggressive rhetoric and started to 
downplay the dispute. Observation of the Chinese media also revealed slight changes in 
the nature of the Chinese press as slight differences in editorial opinion appeared 
between the Renminribao and the Jiefangjunbao. In Hong Kong, although the media 
continued to condemn the 'unpatriotic' Chinese government and provide anti-Japanese 
rhetoric, challenges were made by the Hong Kong media to the value of costly and 
damaging protest exercises. 
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The media and public sentiment generally does not have much influence over foreign 
policy except in exceptional circumstances. The 'Lighthouse Incident' revealed that 
there are intense provocateurs out there posing a threat, but it would take more than 
Japanese ultranationalists landing on their own islands and even the death of a Hong 
Kong activist to have an i1npact on foreign policy. The governments did not change their 
funda1nental stance but did 1nake adjust1nents particularly in China where the 
govern1nent acted to defuse anti-Japanese sentiment. Foreign policy is generally too well 
insulated and removed from the people to be affected by either the public or the media 
. . 1n 1naJor ways. 
Although policy shifts made by the Chinese government were slight, evidence gathered 
through the press suggests that Chinese public sentiment as expressed in Hong Kong 
and less obviously in the rest of China, combined with the influence of the Hong Kong 
1nedia to affect policy. In Japan, policy was less influenced by the media and sentiment 
despite Japan being an open and democratic liberal society. 
Influence over foreign policy by public sentiment and the media can take place but only 
in exceptional circumstances as underlying elements over time can reveal to the 
government a need for some change. Policy adjustment if made gradually, can still 
enable the government to appear to be in control while catering to domestic influence, 
even in an authoritarian regime. The Chinese government driven by fear of an escalation 
in hannful anti-Japanese sentiment expressed most threateningly by the public and press 
in Hong Kong, adjusted policy as a response to calls by the Chinese public that the 
Chinese government was not protecting Chinese sovereignty against the 'hated' 
Japanese. Despite the controversy caused by the dispute, the nature remained 'small in 
scale' and 'local in nature' as both governments acted to ultimately preserve important 
bilateral relations. Policy adjustment did occur and although sentiment in China did 
have some i1npact, these adjustments were made on the need to avoid a small-scale 
problen1 affecting an important larger picture. 
Regardless of the political nature of a country, in order for the media and public 
sentiment to have a 1najor influence on foreign policy, the issue must do more than just 
create a 'lightning rod effect'. The issue must be one that most of the public feel 
strongly about and are willing to protest against in a focused manner over an extended 
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period of time. Anti-Japanese sentiment in China is intense, shared by the majority of 
the Chinese people and has existed for some time. Although such circumstances are 
rare, it is this depth of sentiment that can create concern for policymakers and is able to 
penetrate and have an effect on the insulated domain of foreign policy. 
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